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Title: Pan-Germany
The disease and cure
Author: André Chéradame
Release Date: June 4, 2023 [eBook #70909]
Language: English
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Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PAN-GERMANY ***
Transcriber’s Note
Italic text displayed as: _italic_
PAN-GERMANY
THE DISEASE AND CURE
By ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME
New Hampshire League To Provide For National Defense and To Enforce
International Peace
Branch of the National Security League
GOV. HENRY W. KEYES, _Honorary President_
FRANK S. STREETER, _President_
DR. ERNEST M. HOPKINS, President of Dartmouth }
ROLLAND H. SPAULDING, Ex-Governor } _Vice-Presidents_
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Clarence E. Carr _Andover_
Frank Knox _Manchester_
Lester F. Thurber _Nashua_
James W. Remick _Concord_
Gordon Woodbury _Bedford_
Nathaniel E. Martin _Concord_
James F. Brennan _Peterborough_
Charles R. Tilton _Tilton_
Andrew L. Felker _Meredith_
John S. B. Davie _Concord_
John B. Jameson _Concord_
Arthur M. Heard _Manchester_
SECRETARY
Hobart Pillsbury _Manchester_
TREASURER
Edward N. Pearson _Concord_
FINANCE COMMITTEE
Gen. Elbert Wheeler _Nashua_
Walter M. Parker _Manchester_
Harry H. Dudley _Concord_
Frederick W. Sawyer _Milford_
Rodney E. Smythe _Plymouth_
E. H. Hallett _Lisbon_
W. H. McCarten _Lancaster_
Arthur H. Hough _Lebanon_
Leslie P. Snow _Rochester_
W. R. Porter _Keene_
Charles E. Tilton _Tilton_
John Scammon _Exeter_
Fred H. Perry _Charlestown_
A. L. Mansfield _Hillsborough_
E. Bertram Pike _Haverhill_
Perley R. Bugbee _Hanover_
STATE HOUSE, CONCORD, N. H., Feb. 1, 1918.
The purpose of this book is to bring to the people of New Hampshire
a knowledge of the German plan to dominate the world by force and a
clear view of what the Germans have done toward the success of their
plan. It sounds a note of warning to every loyal American, to give
his greatest help to win the war. Read this and think about it.
[Illustration: Henry W. Keyes.]
Honorary President.
[Illustration: Frank S. Streeter.]
President.
[Illustration: Clarence E. Carr.]
Chairman Executive Committee.
[Illustration: Hobart Pillsbury.]
Secretary.
Pan-Germany
The Disease and Cure
By André Chéradame
[Illustration: Decoration]
_Reprinted from several issues of The Atlantic Monthly_
The Atlantic Monthly Press
Three Park Street, Boston, Mass.
_Copyright, 1917_
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY COMPANY
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS, INC.
[No student outside of Germany itself has studied the Pan-German
scheme in all its details more thoroughly than the distinguished
French publicist, André Chéradame. For more than twenty years he has
devoted all his energies and resources, physical and intellectual
alike, to a vigorous and exhaustive investigation of the origin and
progress of the monstrous conspiracy which threatens to overwhelm the
liberties of the entire world. His books, long unheeded, now read
like prophecies. The papers reprinted in this pamphlet originally
appeared in The Atlantic Monthly, where they attracted very great
interest. They are now published in inexpensive form, so that every
American who desires a clear understanding of the meaning of this
war may have a chance to read them. To careful readers we recommend
M. Chéradame’s more elaborate books, “The Pan-German Plot Unmasked”
and “Pan-Germanism and the United States,” published by Charles
Scribner’s Sons.
A new series of articles by this author will appear in The Atlantic
Monthly for 1918.]
[Illustration: PAN GERMANY at the beginning of 1917
PAN-GERMANY AS IT IS]
Pan-Germany
The Disease and Cure
CHAPTER I
HOW CHEAPLY GERMANY HAS FOUGHT THE WAR
At the beginning of 1916, I said in my book _The Pan-German Plot
Unmasked_,—
‘Finally, when all negotiations for an armistice have fallen flat
and Germany’s situation has become still more critical, we shall see
Berlin play her trump card. Protests against territorial annexations
will become insistent beyond the Rhine, secretly sanctioned by
the German government, which will finally say to the Allies: “Let
this slaughtering of one another cease! We are willing to listen
to reason; we resign our claims to those territories of yours now
occupied by our armies. The game has been played to a draw; so let us
treat for peace on that basis.”
‘On the day when this proposition is put forward, the Allies will
find themselves face to face with the most subtle move yet made by
Berlin—the most insidious German snare. Then, above all things, must
the steadfastness, the perspicacity, and the unity of the Allies be
most brilliantly made manifest. The trick of the “drawn game,” if
successful, would involve an overwhelming triumph for Germany and an
irreparable tragedy for the Allies and for the liberty of the world.’
Only a few months after these lines were printed, the prophecy began
to be fulfilled more and more completely. Every possible step has
been taken by Germany to bring about peace on the basis of a draw.
The slogan, ‘Peace without annexations or indemnities,’ was coined to
that end. At first the Allies believed that this formula originated
in Russia; as a matter of fact, however, it was worked out in Berlin
and then suggested to the Russian Socialists through secret agents
whom Germany has successfully established in the Petrograd _Soviet_.
These Socialists, doubtless well-meaning, but over-fond of theories
and always ready to embrace the wildest utopian schemes,—ignorant,
too, of all realities, as has been shown by the steady aggravation
of the general situation in Russia since they came into power with
the Revolution,—have declared enthusiastically for the ‘peace without
annexations and indemnities.’ As there exist also in the other Allied
countries groups of Socialists with a stronger grip on theories
than on facts, and also because Allied sympathies naturally rallied
strongly to the support of the Russian Revolution, the formula,
‘peace without annexations or indemnities,’ thanks to its apparent
origin, has unquestionably made serious inroads on a certain section
of Allied public opinion.
The Stockholm manœuvres, engineered by all the powerful and varied
means at the disposal of German propagandists, were designed to
establish this formula as the fixed basis of all peace negotiations.
When the astuteness of the Allied governments prevented the
fulfillment of this attempt within the period desired by Berlin,
the Vatican was persuaded through Viennese agencies to throw its
influence on the side of peace as determined by Germany.
As a matter of fact, the Pope’s peace proposals, while not embodying
the exact terms of the Kaiser’s formula, involved, in the last
analysis, practically the same essential results. Berlin, therefore,
in order to assure unceasing discussion of her formula,—a discussion
tending at least to bring about an armistice, which would split
up and morally disarm the Allies, thus making it possible for her
to deal with them separately,—outdid herself in mobilizing toward
one end the most widely divergent forces, from the Maximalist
anarchists of Petrograd to the most hidebound reactionaries of the
Sacred College. The extent, the vigor, and the persistence of the
amazing ‘pacifist’ offensive launched by Germany were such that
the expressions ‘peace without indemnities or annexations,’ ‘drawn
game,’ ‘white peace,’ ‘_paix boiteuse_,’ have become as current in
the Allied countries as if they had some established connection
with reality. This is entirely contrary to the fact: with the best
intentions in the world, _peace without annexations or indemnities,
as things stand now, is impossible. There can be no ‘white peace,’ no
‘drawn game,’ no ‘paix boiteuse.’_
To tell the truth, a section of Allied opinion has become befuddled
by these formulæ of Berlin, whose function is to accomplish in
the moral order the same asphyxiating action as that of the gases
employed on the battlefield by the German General Staff. The result
of this moral intoxication is that important groups of the Allies
begin to juggle with words and lose sight of facts. As the natural
outcome of giving serious thought to impossibilities, grave errors
are made in weighing the present situation, with an attendant
weakening of the joint action of the Allied democracies. It is
imperative, therefore, that the pursuit of Utopias, leading only to
disaster, be abandoned, and that we return to those realities which
alone can lead to victory and the establishment of a durable peace.
If the formula ‘peace without annexations and indemnities’ has been
allowed to insinuate itself into the general discussion, it is only
because great numbers of the Allied peoples fail to understand the
overwhelming advantages which Germany, by means of the war, has been
able to assure to herself for the present and the future. The object
of this paper is to show just what these advantages are, and at the
same time to brand the utter hypocrisy of the slogan, ‘peace without
annexations and indemnities,’ which, regarded even in the most
favorable light, would allow Germany to make off with immense booty,
leaving the Allies to face the incalculable losses incurred by them
in a war launched by their adversary.
_The significance of the low rate of German exchange_
The continual fall of German exchange is regarded by many of the
Allies as proof of the progressive and irremediable impoverishment
of Germany. When, for instance, the mark drops 47 per cent in
Switzerland, while the franc has depreciated only 13 per cent,
Frenchmen are for the most part inclined to believe that the war has
affected the two countries in relatively the same proportion; they
then conclude that Germany’s financial situation is infinitely worse
than that of France. In reality, such a comprehensive conclusion
cannot be reached simply through the rise and fall of exchange, which
reflects only certain special aspects of the financial situation of a
country.
Among the various causes affecting exchange, there are two principal
ones. The first is moral. It cannot be denied that the fluctuation
of exchange responds to foreign confidence. If German exchange is
low, it implies, to a certain extent at least, the existence of a
universal conviction that in the long run Germany cannot hold out
against her formidable ring of adversaries. As a result, there is no
great demand for the currency of a state whose credit, it is thought,
must finally collapse. It should be noted, however, that the reason
for this fall of exchange is only a moral evaluation anticipating a
probable outcome; it is not due to a mathematically certain estimate
of what Germany now stands to win or lose as a result of the war.
The second great factor affecting exchange, on the other hand, is
based on present realities which are susceptible of being accurately
determined. Germany, since she has been blockaded by sea, exports
infinitely less than formerly; consequently, her ability to settle
her accounts in foreign countries is limited. When she was able to
sell the United States a million marks’ worth of merchandise, she
then had at her disposal a million marks with which to pay cash
for such imports as she needed. Now that her exports have been so
reduced, she has little money to spare for spending abroad. If she
wishes to increase these foreign purchases, she must export her gold
and consequently reduce the security behind her banknotes. This
results in a lowering of the basis of German credit, with a resulting
drop in exchange.
We shall now see that this falling exchange, whatever its importance,
does not take into account all the elements of the general financial
situation.
If the blockade of Germany seriously complicates her food problems,
on the other hand it is in a way advantageous from a financial point
of view. In a word, when Germany found herself blockaded she was
obliged to evolve means of existing on her own resources or those
of her allies. Our enemies had great difficulties of organization
to overcome, but they turned them to good account: for if Germany’s
exports are small, her imports have been correspondingly reduced.
Hence she needs to send very little money abroad—a fact which is
financially in her favor.
Now, the case of France is radically different. The French
government, feeling assured of the liberty of the seas and believing
that the war would be a short one, found it more expedient to
place enormous orders abroad than to rely on domestic resources to
supply the nation’s need. As a result, French imports, according
to published statistics, exceed exports by one billion of francs
a month. This means that, as things stand now, France must pay
to foreign countries the staggering sum of twelve billion francs
a year, with no corresponding compensation, since her purchases
consist of products which are destroyed in use. For this reason
France is undergoing serious impoverishment while Germany gets off
comparatively easily. It is therefore plain that the fluctuations of
exchange bear little relation to those conditions which must be taken
into consideration in making an appraisal of the general situation;
they reflect, in fact, only a special and limited aspect of the
financial situation as a whole. Popular conclusions drawn from the
fall in the value of the mark are false when attempts are made to
give them an absolute or general significance.
_Why people are still ignorant of the vast advantages gained by
Germany from the war_
Many of the Allies are hoodwinked by the ‘great illusion’ which even
now prevents them, to their endless detriment, from seeing things as
they actually are. In the Allied nations, in fact, people continue to
speak of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, as if these
states remained just as they were before the war. But these terms
have no longer any relation to reality. The Quadruple Alliance of
Central Europe is simply a great illusion, studiously fostered by
William II, for by its means his plans are vastly facilitated. As a
matter of fact, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary are not the
allies, but the vassals, of Berlin, and their influence with her is
less than that of Saxony or Bavaria. The rulers at Constantinople,
Sofia, Vienna, and Budapest are simply marionettes moved by threads
which are pulled by Berlin according to her strategic needs.
Very often we hear it said, ‘Germany has created _Mitteleuropa_.’
This is another mistake. Geographically speaking, _Mitteleuropa_
includes only Central Europe; and Germany’s dominion is infinitely
further flung, extending as it does from the west front in France
to the British front before Bagdad. If we wish to see things in the
light of reality, we must say, for the present at least, ‘_There
is no longer any Germany; instead, there is Pan-Germany_.’ This
is an essential assumption if we are to reason justly. The map of
Pan-Germany at the beginning of 1917, which is printed above, shows
clearly the essential, but all-too-little-known elements of the
present situation, which is characterized by the fact that 73 million
Germans, aided by 21 million vassals,—Magyars, Slavs, and Turks,—have
reduced to slavery 82 millions of Latins, Slavs, and Semites,
belonging to thirteen different nationalities. Pan-Germany, which has
now almost completely reached the limits set by the Pan-German plan
of 1911, consists, therefore, of one vast territory containing about
176 million inhabitants and natural resources of the greatest variety.
I beg my readers to refer to this map of Pan-Germany every time
it is made desirable by the text. This repeated study of the map
is indispensable to a clear and complete comprehension of the
demonstration which follows. As regards the profits which Germany has
wrung from the war, it is particularly important, in order to grasp
the idea of Pan-Germany; for it is the direct result of its creation
that Germany, in spite of the losses and expenses inevitably incurred
by a warring nation, has been able to assure herself of certain
advantages which, considered as a whole, far outbalance her losses
and expenses, as we shall see.
In order to understand the nature of these advantages, one point must
first be made clear.
_The war has cost the Germans comparatively little_
For six fundamental reasons, the conduct of the war has really cost
the Germans far less than it has cost their adversaries.
1. _No Experimentation._ Germany, in order to produce a vast output
of various types of guns and projectiles economically evolved in
times of peace, needed only to extend, by means of machinery of
domestic manufacture, her arsenals and munition-factories, which
before the war were already considerable. On the other hand, the
production of war-material in France at the outbreak of hostilities
was very slack, while in England and Russia it was almost negligible.
In these three countries, therefore, it was necessary to improvise,
as best might be, thousands of new plants, to equip them with
machinery purchased in America at vast expense, and hastily to evolve
new types of cannon, projectiles, and the rest. Now, improvisation,
especially in war-time, means false starts and inevitable bad work,
which must be paid dearly for. Germany was not obliged to incur these
very considerable expenses.
2. _Regulated Wages._ The fact that the problem of German wages was
worked out at leisure in exact correlation to productions whose types
were exhaustively studied in the calm of peace-time certainly allowed
the Germans to obtain war-materials at a lower net cost than was
possible for the Allies.
3. _The Prevention of Waste._ The absence of experimentation and the
simple extension to war-work of highly efficient industrial methods
tested in peace-time, naturally allowed the Germans to avoid in all
spheres those immense losses of material of every nature whose bad
effects and heavy cost were incurred by the Allies. This state of
affairs in France caused losses which were as expensive as they were
inevitable. One may imagine the conditions existing in Russia, where
control is far more difficult of exercise than in France.
4. _Cheap Labor._ The Germans have forcibly enlisted the labor of
about two million prisoners of war. Moreover, the official French
report of April 12, 1917, concerning acts committed by the Germans
in violation of international law, asserts that in the occupied
territories deportation of workers has been a _general measure_. It
has ‘applied to the entire able-bodied population of both sexes,
from the ages of sixteen to sixty, excepting women with young
children.’
Now, the Germans requisition labor from among 7,500,000 Belgians,
3,000,000 French, 4,500,000 Serbians, 5,000,000 Roumanians,
22,000,000 Poles, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians—a total of 42,000,000
slaves.
Let us see what sort of remuneration is made. Take the case of a
young girl of Lille, twenty years old, who was forced to work for six
months, harvesting and threshing wheat and digging potatoes from six
in the morning to twilight, receiving all the while the vilest food.
For her six months of work she was given 9 francs, 45 centimes. The
Germans, therefore, have at their disposal a vast reservoir of labor
for which they pay next to nothing; moreover, the small amounts they
do pay remain in Pan-Germany.
The Allies, on the contrary, pay high wages to their workers, and,
when they run short, must needs pour out good gold in bringing
reinforcements from Asia, Africa, and America. This means that a
considerable part of the wages paid these foreign workmen will leave
France or England for all time.
5. _Free Coal and Iron Ore._ In addition to their own mines, the
Germans have seized important coal and iron mines in France, Belgium,
and Poland. A vast proportion of their ore and coal therefore costs
them nothing. Naturally, then, a German shell made with French
iron and Belgian coal costs far less than a French shell made with
American steel and English coal. As a result, the net price of a
greater part of German munitions is much lower than that paid by the
Allies.
6. _Economical Transportation._ By reason of the grouping of the
Central Powers,—a result of the conquest of the Danube front by
the Teutons,—Germany profits by a geographical situation which is
infinitely more advantageous than that of the Allies, as regards not
only the speed, but also the cheapness, of war-transportation. It is
evident that it costs far less to send a shell from the Krupp factory
to any one of the Pan-German fronts than to send an American shell
to France, a Japanese shell to the Polish front, a French shell to
Roumania _via_ Archangel, or an English shell to the army operating
in Mesopotamia. By the same token, the cost of transporting a soldier
of Pan-Germany to any of the battle-fronts is infinitely lighter than
that of transporting Allied soldiers from Australia or America.
We should note that each one of these six factors which we have
just enumerated reacts profoundly on the sum-total of general
war-expenses, and that, taken together, they involve a formidable
sum. It can therefore truthfully be said that Germany carries on
the war much more economically than the Allies. Figures are so far
lacking which will give the true proportions, but we shall certainly
remain well within the realities of the case if we conclude that, as
a result of the six factors mentioned above, France must spend one
hundred and fifty million francs for war material to every hundred
million spent by Germany. When, therefore, France spends thirty
billions, Germany evidently spends not more than twenty billions. And
what is true of France applies even more accurately to some of the
other Allied nations.
This is a fact of the greatest general importance in coming to a true
understanding of the financial situation created by the war—a fact
which takes on its full significance when we realize that Germany is
not only carrying on the war cheaply, but that she has been enabled,
by means of this war, to win _very important advantages_.
They consist of seven principal elements. The last six of these,
it should be noted without fail, depend solely on the existence of
central Pan-Germany—that is, on the hegemony exercised by Germany
over Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; they are therefore
wholly independent of the first element, which relates to Germany’s
occupation of enemy territories, particularly to the east and west.
They may be summarized as follows:—
SEVEN ELEMENTS IN TWO GROUPS
_The first group includes_:—
The advantages derived directly from Germany’s aggression, comprised
in a single element, namely, the plunder accruing from the occupation
of enemy territory. This may be analyzed thus:—
(_a_) The value of the 500,000 square kilometres of Montenegrin,
Serbian, Roumanian, Russian, Belgian, and French land held by the
Germans.
This value, estimated according to the national fortunes of the
respective countries before the war,—the area and population of
the occupied portions being taken into consideration,—is in the
neighborhood of 155 billion francs.
This figure, though naturally only approximate, is probably far below
the real sum. We know that the entire national fortune of France,
with its 536,000 square kilometres, was put before the war at 325
billion francs. The valuation of the 500,000 square kilometres of
occupied territory at 155 billions seems therefore an underestimate,
especially when one remembers that these 500,000 square kilometres
include Belgium and the North of France—the richest districts in the
world.
(_b_) The plunder of human beings, supplies, and property (laborers,
war-material, provisions, minerals, raw products, manufactured
products, personal property, art objects, war levies, specie, jewels,
and securities) which has been going on, in some cases for as long
as three years, throughout the occupied territories. This booty
unquestionably represents a value of tens of billions of francs.
These tens of billions should be deducted from the total of the
national fortunes of the invaded districts. The plunder in question
is composed of property or supplies already used up by the Germans or
taken away by them into Germany; the value it represents, therefore,
no longer exists in the invaded districts.
* * * * *
_The second group includes_:—
The advantages which Germany has assured herself for the present or
for the future through the creation of Pan-Germany, which in turn
result from
(_a_) Germany’s burglarization of her own allies—Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey.
(_b_) The seizure by Germany and her allies of Serbia; in all six
elements:—
I. The Pan-German loans, which throw Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey into a state of absolute financial dependence on Berlin.
II. The value of Germany’s monopoly in exploiting the latent
resources of the Balkans and Asia Minor, resulting from the
Pan-German loans.
III. The inherent value of the creation of Economic Pan-Germany. This
cannot fail to be a powerful instrument for the acquisition of wealth.
IV. The value of Military Pan-Germany, which is a guaranty of the
security of Economic Pan-Germany.
V. The value of the enormous economic profits assured to Berlin
through the existence of Pan-Germany _at the cost of Russia_. These
are a direct consequence of the establishment of Military Pan-Germany.
VI. The taking over by Germany of at least 21 billions of French
credit. This is a consequence of the establishment of Economic
Pan-Germany.
CHAPTER II
HOW MUCH GERMANY HAS WON IN THE WAR
Let us now take up, in their order, the seven elements mentioned in
the last chapter.
I
_The first element of German advantage: the booty acquired from the
occupation of enemy territory_
Germany is getting direct war-profits from the enemy territories
occupied by her. These territories, listed in the ascending order
of their richness, are: Montenegro, 14,000 square kilometres;
Albania, 20,000; Serbia, 87,000; Roumania, 70,000 (Bulgaria and
Austria-Hungary share the pillage of these four territories);
dependent territories of Russia, 260,000; Belgium, 29,000; and
France, 20,000; making a grand total of 500,000 square kilometres.
In order to realize as clearly as possible the importance of the
booty wrung by Germany from this enormous area, we may establish by
means of examples or statistics that this plunder comes from nine
principal sources:—
_Seizure of Human Material._—Throughout these 500,000 square
kilometres of occupied territory, the Germans have scientifically
enslaved 42,000,000 human beings, who furnish a vast amount of
labor—this labor being all the cheaper because, as we shall see, the
slaves are robbed in various ways.
_Seizure of War-Material._—By reason of their lightning advances
in Belgium, France, Serbia, and Roumania the Germans have taken
possession of vast stores of war-material: cannon, rifles, munitions,
wagons, locomotives, cars, as well as thousands of kilometres of
railway, of which they make full use, representing a certain value of
billions of francs. (The Belgian railway system alone is worth three
billions.)
_Seizure of Food-stuffs._—The official report of April 12, 1917, on
the acts committed by the Germans in France contrary to international
law, states: ‘The inhabitants, subjected as they were to annoyances
of every sort, watched daily the theft of such food-stuffs as they
happened to possess.’ Everywhere the Germans steal horses, cattle,
domestic animals, grain, potatoes, food-products of all kinds,
sugar, alcohol, all of which constitute the reserve supply of the
occupied countries. Their harvests, too, are appropriated through the
cultivation of productive lands by means of labor obtained almost
without cost from the enslaved peoples.
_Theft of Raw Materials._—Throughout the length and breadth of the
occupied territories, the Germans, at the dictates of expediency,
have seized raw materials: coal and iron ore, copper, petroleum, and
so forth. Metals—bronze, zinc, lead, copper, tin—have been taken from
private citizens, as well as textile fabrics—wool, cotton cloth, and
the like. When one learns that from the cities of the North of France
alone the Germans stole 550 million francs’ worth of wool, it is easy
to see that this single source of plunder has been worth a number of
billions to them.
_Theft of Finished Products._—Everywhere in the occupied territories,
so far as means of transportation permit, motors, steam-hammers,
machinery, rolling-mills, lathes, presses, drills, electrical
engines, looms, and so forth, have been taken to pieces by mechanics
and transported into Germany. The total value of this stolen material
in Belgium and the North of France alone—the richest industrial
districts in the world—is almost incalculable.
_Theft of Personal Property._—The official French report previously
quoted states: ‘In the shops, officers and soldiers made free with
whatever pleased their fancy. Every day the people witnessed the
theft of property which was indispensable to them. At Ham, General
von Fleck carried off all the furniture of M. Bernot’s house, where
he had been quartered.’ The property thus stolen is sent to Germany,
as is proved by this advertisement in the _Kölnische Zeitung_:
‘Furniture moved from the theatre of military operations to all
destinations.’ From this source, war-booty to the value of several
billions has already been divided among an army of Germans.
_Seizure of Works of Art._—The Germans have stolen countless
works of art, ‘in order’—so runs a recent official note of their
government—‘that they may be preserved as a record of art and
civilization.’—‘It would be impossible,’ declares _Le Temps_, ‘to
find a more cynical admission of the thefts committed by the German
authorities in our museums and public buildings.’ If one remembers
that this methodical pillage has gone merrily on among private
individuals, drawing on the unlimited stores of works of art which
have been accumulated throughout the centuries in Poland, and
particularly in Belgium and France, it must certainly be apparent
that the value of these stolen art treasures is immense.
_War Imposts._—Our official report establishes that ‘Requisitions
have everywhere been continuous. Towns that have had to meet the
expenses of troops quartered within their jurisdiction have been
overwhelmed by huge levies.’
Belgium is staggering under an annual war assessment of 480,000,000
francs. Bucharest, after its capture by the Germans, was forced
to pay a levy amounting to about 1900 francs per capita of the
population. At Craiova the levy was 950 francs per capita. An edict
forbids the circulation of paper money unless it has been specially
stamped by the Germans, who retain 30 per cent of its nominal value.
In April, 1917, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ announced that the leaders
of the Austro-German forces of occupation in Roumania would shortly
call for an obligatory internal loan of a hundred million francs.
In Poland, the German government has just issued a billion marks in
paper money for enforced circulation. These are only single examples.
_Theft of Specie, Jewels, and Securities._—In September, 1916, the
Germans seized three quarters of a billion francs from the National
Bank of Belgium in Brussels, which was subsequently transferred to
Germany. In January, 1917, on the steamer Prinz Hendrick, they stole
a million francs from a Belgian who was traveling from England,
and took ten million francs’ worth of diamonds from the mail-bags.
In the village of Vraignes, on March 18, 1917, the Germans, before
evicting the inhabitants, stole from them the 13,800 francs they
had in their possession. At Noyon—we learn from the official report
already quoted—the Germans broke open and pillaged the safes of banks
and private citizens before retiring from the town. The securities,
jewels, and silver plate of Noyon represented a value of about
eighteen million francs. And, as I have said, these are only random
incidents.
Taking into consideration, then, the present high prices of
food-products, coal, metal, petroleum, war-material, machinery,
and the rest, it can be seen at a glance that each one of the
nine sources of booty just enumerated, on which the Germans have
been steadily drawing, in some cases for as much as three years,
has unquestionably yielded the value of several billions of
francs,—certain of them, perhaps, tens of billions. Hence we may
reasonably conclude that, without fixing a definite figure for the
yield of these nine sources, the total plunder has mounted well up in
the tens of billions.
Another basis for calculating the worth of the invaded territories
to Germany lies in the fact that the national fortunes of these
countries, according to ante-bellum statistics, amounted to about 155
billions of francs.
* * * * *
We shall now examine the six other elements of Germany’s present
advantageous situation—those which result from the domination
which the war has enabled her to exert over her own allies,
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This domination, which amounts
practically to actual seizure, has permitted her to fulfill the
scheme of Central Pan-Germany as a result of the crushing of Serbia.
II
_The second element of German advantage: the Pan-German loans_
A portion of the approximate sum of 115 billion francs devoted by
Germany, up to the end of July, 1917, to the carrying on of the war
has enabled her to burglarize her own allies by taking advantage of
the extremely bad financial situation which faced them at the end
of the Balkan wars. As a result of this situation, Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, in order to sustain the present long-drawn-out
struggle, have been forced to draw on the credit of Berlin. The sum
total of the loans made by Germany to her allies and secured by her
own war loans cannot yet be verified, but there can be no doubt that
it mounts up to a respectable number of billions.
These loans have worked out to the immense advantage of Germany, for
the following reasons. Established facts prove that, without the
assistance of Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops, and
without the numerous products supplied her by the Orient, Germany
would have been beaten long ago, even in spite of the Allies’
blundering. As these troops and resources are of priceless value to
Germany, it would seem that she must have paid dearly for them, and
in gold. However, as the reserve of the German Imperial Bank was
1,356,875,000 marks in July, 1914, and 2,527,315,000 in February,
1917, it is certain that Germany has not lent gold to her allies,—in
large quantities, at any rate,—but only paper, whose value depends
solely on the strength of German credit.
In reality, therefore, Germany, simply by keeping a printing-press
busy turning out little stamped slips of paper, has obtained troops,
food-stuffs, and raw materials which were indispensable to her in
avoiding defeat; and at the same time she has so established herself
as a creditor as to give her the right to exact final payment by her
allies for advances which were primarily made to them in Germany’s
own vital interest.
Now these obligations weigh so heavily on countries like
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, already in sore stress, that
they incur loans which no one of these three countries can ever hope
to pay off unless a victory of the Allied democracies should shatter
the financial yoke of Berlin.
In order to appreciate the nature of these loans and their
consequences, the example of Turkey is particularly instructive.
‘Germany’s advances to Turkey in no way represent Turkish
war-expenditure. We must add to them the requisitions made in the
country itself, and the war-material purchased in Germany and
Austria-Hungary which is not yet paid for.’
At the beginning of 1917 Djavid Bey arranged in Berlin for a new
loan of three million pounds, simply to enable Turkey to pay her
debts to the Krupp firm, as well as the advances made her by the
different groups of financiers and the German Minister of Finance.
This means, therefore, that, when Germany sends arms to the Turks
in order that they may use them to consolidate the Pan-German
scheme, she also finds a means of making this consignment of arms
serve to entangle the Turks still more hopelessly in the financial
web. ‘In Pan-Germanist circles, there has been much discussion of
the compensations which Turkey must make to Germany in return for
services rendered in the course of the war. It is the unanimous
opinion that Germany, without gaining any territorial acquisitions in
Turkey, must have controlling rights in the Ottoman Empire, so that
the Pera-Galata bridge may be as near Berlin as Constantinople.’
What has taken place in the spheres of finance between Berlin and
Constantinople has, by the very nature of things, been duplicated
between Berlin and Sofia, though of course in a less pronounced form.
Germany, therefore, by means of paper loans based on her own credit,
has caused colossal obligations to be assumed by her allies—countries
representing vast areas of land: Austria-Hungary with 676,616 square
kilometres, Bulgaria with 114,104, and Turkey with 1,792,900, or
2,583,620 square kilometres in all. Now these three countries are
precisely the ones which are indispensable to the carrying out of the
Central Pan-German ‘Hamburg to the Persian Gulf’ scheme; the loans,
therefore, are Pan-Germanist loans.
It should be borne in mind, on the other hand, that although
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are financially encumbered
_in their quality of states_, the exploitation of these countries
by the Germans is very profitable. Their combined national fortunes
were estimated, before the war, at about 269 billion francs. We
must realize also that, although these loans granted by Berlin to
her allies are merely paper loans, they bind Turkey, Bulgaria, and
Austria-Hungary to Germany as closely as debtors can be bound to
a creditor. None of these three countries can reasonably hope to
get funds after the war from their present adversaries, who, it is
certain, will have none too much money for their own needs; and so
the financial situation as a whole combines with the enterprise shown
by the Berlin General Staff to strengthen the grip which Germany has
obtained over her allies through loans.
As this financial dependence of the three vassal states, with its
tremendous consequences, is, as I have said, maintained simply by
means of a printing-press and little slips of paper, which cost
very little indeed; and since Germany receives in exchange for
these slips of paper bearing her signature, men, food-stuffs, and
supplies which, but for the action of the Allies, would enable her
to establish Pan-Germany as mistress of Europe, we may safely say
that the Pan-Germanist loans floated by Berlin at her allies’ expense
constitute a powerful element of military advantage, which, if one
but examines the conditions of its origin, must stand out as the most
profitable and extraordinary swindle ever perpetrated.
III
_The third element of German advantage: the value of a monopoly in
exploiting the latent resources of the Balkans and Asia Minor_
The figure of 269 billions of francs quoted above takes no account of
the enormous agricultural and mineral wealth, as yet unexploited and
unappraised, of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. Now, the business
of tapping these vast reservoirs is entirely in the hands of the
Germans, as a result of the Pan-Germanist loans.
IV
_The fourth element of German advantage: the value resulting from
the creation of an economic Pan-Germany_
Economic Pan-Germany, as it was outlined by List, Roscher, Rodbertus,
and other German economists, may be defined as follows: A territory
uniting under one supreme central control Central Europe, the
Balkans, and Turkey—_a territory large enough to include military and
economic resources entirely sufficient to provide for the needs of
the population in times of war; and to assure its rulers in times of
peace the domination of the world_.
The seizure by Berlin of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—all
essential elements of Central Pan-Germany—was accomplished in three
ways: _militarily_, by the supremacy acquired by the German General
Staff over the troops of the vassal states; _financially_, by means
of the paper loans granted by Germany; and _diplomatically_, by the
treaties signed in Berlin on January 11, 1917, establishing the
strongest sort of German protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. This
done, the consolidation of Pan-Germany was quickly undertaken by
Berlin in a great number of ways.
_Control of Customs._—As the establishment of the great Pan-German
_Zollverein_ (Customs Union) was not to be accomplished at one
stroke, the Kaiser’s government set about preparing the necessary
steps. Numerous conferences held at Berlin and attended by German,
Austrian, and Hungarian statesmen and business men, resulted in the
following essential provisions. (1) An economic customs agreement
of long duration, which would make a single economic unit of
Germany and Austria-Hungary; (2) to bring this about gradually, a
progressive increase of duty—free articles, and a unification of
the customs charges on certain goods; (3) a close economic union
between Austro-Germany and Bulgaria and Turkey, to be arranged and
established with the greatest possible expedition.
_Ethnographic Control._—Certain nations afford considerable
resistance to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme. The Serbians, who are
morally irreducible, are an obstacle to the permanent establishment
of the Pan-German nexus between Hungary and Bulgaria; and without
this the entire Pan-German programme falls flat. The systematic
destruction of the Serbian people has been entrusted to the Bulgars,
who, under pretext of quelling insurrections, slaughter not only
the Serbian men, but also women and children, down to babies at the
breast. In the Ottoman Empire the Armenians happen to occupy those
regions which were characterized in the Reichstag by Herr Delbrück
as ‘Germanic India.’ Berlin therefore puts to good use the Turks’
inherited taste for massacres of Christians. Already more than one
million Armenians have been got out of the way.
_Agricultural Control._—The food crisis in Germany has led Berlin to
proceed with the greatest haste toward utilizing the rich farming
districts which the fortunes of war have put within her grasp.
Hundreds of experts, with thousands of agricultural implements,
have been sent to Roumania, Serbia, and Asia Minor. In this latter
country, two cultural centres in particular have received attention.
In the province of Adana cotton-growing is being developed; on the
plains of Anatolia the intensive cultivation of grain is in progress.
These energetic efforts have had a twofold result: the Turks will
not revolt against Germanic domination—because of starvation, if for
no other reason; and, by reason of the increasing yield of Serbian,
Roumanian, and Turkish lands, more of which are continually being
brought into service, the food-supply of the Central Empires becomes
more and more completely assured.
_Banking Control._—The exploitation of Eastern Pan-Germany calls for
vast capital. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish
banks have formed powerful combinations. As the leaders of this
movement in Germany we find the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the
Kölnische Bankverein; in Austria-Hungary the Vienna Kredit-Anstalt
and the Hungarian Bank of Credit in Budapest.
_Economic Control._—As the rapid exploitation of the latent
resources of the Balkans and Turkey is the principal economic object
of the Germans, they have just established, in coöperation with
King Ferdinand, the ‘Institute for Furthering Economic Relations
between Germany and Bulgaria.’ In order to facilitate the Germanic
penetration of Turkey, ten thousand Turkish boys between the ages of
twelve and eighteen years are to come to Germany for their technical
education. These young Turks, living in German families, learning
German, and saturating themselves with German ideas, will soon be
able collaborators with the Teutons themselves in germanizing Turkey
and exploiting the numerous concessions which, if the war turns out
successfully for them, will be wrung from the Ottoman government by
the subjects of the Kaiser.
_Railway Control._—The railway systems of European Pan-Germany have
been brought to the highest degree of perfection. In Turkey, German
officers are absolutely in control of the railroads. Out of the
2435 kilometres which separate Constantinople from Bagdad, only 583
kilometres of line remain to be constructed—and this distance is
traversed by automobile roads. As for the Turkish railroads belonging
to French and English companies, the German government has suggested
that the Turks ‘purchase’ them. One should cherish no illusions as
to the real meaning of this word ‘purchase.’ It means, according to
Turco-German methods, that the expenses involved in this purchase
should be set down against the war damages which the Central Powers
consider to be due them from the Allies.
_Canal Control._—The canal project, outlined as far back as April
26, 1895, by the Pan-Germanist Dr. G. Zoepfl, was taken up and
begun by the Economic Congress of Central Europe, which met at
Berlin on March 19, 1917. This project is made up of the following
elements: (1) Union of the Rhine with the Danube by the opening up to
navigation of the Main and of the canal from the Main to the Danube.
(2) Completion of the central canal joining the Vistula and the
Rhine. (3) The Oder-Danube canal, joining the Baltic and Black Sea.
(4) Opening to navigation of the Rhine as far as Bâle. (5) Union of
the Elbe with the Danube by means of the river Moldau. (6) Union of
the Weser with the Main by means of the Fulda-Werra. (7) Connection
of the Danube and the Vistula by means of canals. (8) Union of the
Danube with the Dniester by means of the Vistula. (9) Opening to
navigation of the Save. (10) Opening to navigation of the Morava
and the Vardar as far as Saloniki. The Danube is the base of this
gigantic programme of construction. ‘The Danube means everything to
us,’ declared General von Groener, in December, 1916.
* * * * *
This rapid sketch of the preparations now going on in the economic
sphere of Pan-Germany will permit any clear-thinking man to
understand the crushing power which will lie in this formidable
system when all its latent resources have been developed by
the Germans to the profit of their hegemony. The organization
of Pan-Germany is only in its first stages; nevertheless, the
concentrated military, economic, and strategic strength which it has
already put at the disposal of Berlin is so great that it permits
Germany to baffle her far more numerous, but widely scattered,
adversaries. What, then, would be the strength of a completely
organized Pan-Germany? It is undeniable, in fact, that a methodical,
big-scale development of all the mineral, vegetable, animal, and
industrial products of economic Pan-Germany, together with the
low-cost transportation afforded by a complete system of canals,
would make it possible for the Germans to pay high wages to their own
workmen, and yet at the same time bring about such a reduction of net
prices in every line of industry as to force Pan-German products on
the whole world by their sheer cheapness.
It is easy to see, then, that in the face of economic Pan-Germany’s
overwhelming methods any economic revival on the part of the European
nations now allied would be impossible. The economic ruin of the
Allies, after so exhausting and costly a war as this, would by the
nature of things bring about their political subjection to Berlin.
Besides, there is not a country in the world which could escape the
clutches of economic Pan-Germany on the one hand, or the consequences
of the irremediable ruin of the Allies on the other. The fact that
Pan-Germany is organizing itself is an ominous event which should
receive the concentrated attention of all the world’s free peoples;
for it places in German hands the elements of such an overwhelming
economic power as has no precedent in the world’s history.
V
_The fifth element of German advantage: the value of military
Pan-Germany_
Berlin relies, above all else, on her military resources to render
secure for all time that economic Pan-Germany which is destined to
provide her, in peace-time, with a permanent means of acquiring
wealth and world-dominion. Military Pan-Germany is, therefore, the
complement and the pledge of economic Pan-Germany. The Kaiser’s
successful seizure, through the fortunes of war, of new sources of
man-power—Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Ottoman soldiery; of new
strategic points or regions of exceptional importance, located in
invaded countries _or in those of his own allies_, has furnished him
with the basis of military Pan-Germany. In 1914, Prussian militarism
held sway over only the 68 million inhabitants of the German Empire.
At the beginning of 1917, it had been extended by consent or by force
to the 176 million people of Pan-Germany.
This result—evidently the consequence of an immense extension of
exclusive influence throughout Central and Eastern Europe—has
permitted the German General Staff to take over at will certain
strategic points or regions of the greatest importance, over which
it exerted no direct influence before the war. Zeebrugge, on the
North Sea, for instance; Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro on the Adriatic;
the Bulgarian coasts of the Ægean; the Ottoman Straits; the Turkish,
Bulgarian, and Roumanian shores of the Black Sea, have always been
strategic points or districts of exceptional value.
This value, however, has become vastly greater now that these
points or districts form part of a single military system under
the directing and organizing power of the Berlin General Staff. At
present, these essential strategic points and districts are the
strongholds of the Pan-German frontiers. They are, in fact, connected
by continuous fortifications, defended in the most effective way
the world has ever known by an intensive system of barbed-wire
entanglements, deep-dug subterranean shelters, machine-guns, and
heavy artillery. The internal military organization of Pan-Germany
is being carried forward with uninterrupted speed. Factories of
war-material have been judiciously distributed throughout the whole
territory, with the double object of utilizing raw materials near
their source of origin, thus avoiding useless transportation, and of
making possible the swift dispatch of munitions to any threatened
sector of front. For this reason the Krupp firm, at the outbreak of
war, established important branch factories, not only in Bavaria, but
also in Bulgaria and Turkey.
The railway system and strategic automobile roads in Pan-Germany have
been developed very swiftly—notably in the Balkans and in Turkey,
where the need was relatively great. Back of every military front
railroads running parallel with that front have been constructed, so
that reinforcements may be sent to any given point with the maximum
of speed. All this, taken as a whole, has converted Pan-Germany into
one gigantic, extremely powerful fortress.
A new phase is now in preparation. The Kaiser’s General Staff, not
content with holding the high command of all forces in Pan-Germany,
is determined to standardize as far as possible their arms, their
munitions, and their methods of instruction. The Deputy Friedrich
Naumann—one of the sponsors of the _Mitteleuropa_ idea—is plainly
smoothing the way toward this end, which, because of geographic
reasons, most intimately concerns Austria-Hungary. In the _Vossische
Zeitung_ he has just outlined a scheme of ‘full and complete
harmony of the Central Empires in so far as military matters are
concerned.’ He boldly adds an avowal which is well worth remembering.
‘_Mitteleuropa_ is in existence to-day. Nothing is lacking save
its organs of movement and action. These organs can be provided by
its two emperors, since they have at their disposal the necessary
elements for the creation of a common army.’
This prophecy merits our close attention; for it can readily be seen
that, if the unification of the Armies of the two Central Empires
were to take place, neither Bulgaria nor Turkey, on whose military
resources the German General Staff is getting an increasingly firm
grip, could prevent the absorption of their armed forces into the
Pan-German system.
As for the military strength of Pan-Germany, it is an easy matter
to estimate it. Even if the Kaiser’s armies were to withdraw from
Russia, Poland, Belgium, and France, Pan-Germany would still include
150,000,000 people. Now, as Germany has mobilized about 20 per
cent of her own population and that of her allies,—who have become
vassals,—we see that Central Pan Germany can count upon approximately
30,000,000 soldiers. Prussian militarism, whose destruction by the
Allies has become the true, legitimate, essential aim of the war, has
therefore become far more widespread, through the carrying out of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, than it was in 1914. It is proved by
well-established facts that Berlin, while vigorously pushing a peace
campaign destined to disunite the Allies, is doing everything in
her power to turn Pan-Germany into a fortress the strength of which
is unexampled in the world’s history. In any case it is undeniable
that, as military Pan-Germany is a pledge of the success of economic
Pan-Germany, its establishment constitutes an important element of
advantage for the German cause. This will be further proved when we
come to examine the two final elements of advantage.
VI
_The sixth element of German advantage: the importance of the vast
economic profits which accrue to Berlin at the expense of Russia
through the establishment of Pan-Germany_
We need only glance at the map to realize that a really free Russian
republic could never range itself on the side of Pan-Germany. It is
self-evident that, if Pan-Germany were to succeed in splitting Europe
in two, her economic and military pressure toward the East would be
irresistible. The countless agents whom Berlin already maintains in
the immense territory of Russia would find their work becoming easier
and easier. Following up the hypothesis, then, Russia, succumbing
to insoluble financial problems and unending internal difficulties,
would break up, from the Baltic to the Pacific, into a series of
anarchistic republics—all of which is according to the plans of
Lenine, who is a creature of Berlin. After that there would be
nothing to prevent German influence from becoming the controlling
force in the economic exploitation of the immense natural riches of
European and Asiatic Russia.
We are well within the bounds of reason in predicting such a
possibility. The fact that German agents have already succeeded in
stirring up most serious trouble throughout the length and breadth
of Russia—that they have provoked separatist movements in Finland,
Ukrainia, and the Caucasus, and that all China is seething with
disturbances which react on Asiatic Russia—proves to the satisfaction
of the most skeptical that the break-up of Russia into little states
inevitably subject to the political and economic influence of Berlin
would be an inevitable consequence of a successful Pan-Germany.
It is plain, therefore, that the huge profits which the Germans would
stand to gain by such a state of affairs—a direct result of military
Pan-Germany—form an element of advantage worthy of being considered
by itself.
VII
_The seventh element of German advantage: the transfer to Germany
of at least twenty-one billion francs of French credit_
The creation of military and economic Pan-Germany makes possible
a method of securing war-booty planned in advance by the
Pan-Germanists, which may be stated as follows: _The transfer to
Germany of funds owed to one of her enemies by another enemy, or by
one of her own allies_.
In order to understand this method of extortion one need only read
a passage from Tannenberg’s book, _Greater Germany_, published in
French translation in 1916 by the firm of Payot. This work possesses
exceptional interest for two reasons: first, it appeared in Germany
in 1911; its publication, therefore, was evidently inspired, as in
many other cases, by the ruling class at Berlin, in order to prepare
the German people for war by promises of colossal booty; second, the
facts of the case show that the German General Staff, ever since the
outbreak of hostilities, has been modeling the political conduct of
the war on the exact lines laid down by Tannenberg, who may be said
to have officially declared the Pan-German scheme of 1911.
Now, independent of the 35 billion marks—nearly 44 billion
francs—which were to be imposed on France in the coming war by way of
regular war indemnity, Tannenberg, in Article 5 of the hypothetical
treaty, outlined the following additional extortion:—
‘France cedes to Germany her claim to the 12 billion marks (15
billion francs) lent by her to Russia.’ This means nothing more or
less than a cession of credit.
On page 308 of Payot’s edition, Tannenberg indicates as follows the
use to be made by Germany of these Russian debts to France:—
‘We shall not be able to give thanks to Holy Russia for this splendid
sum, for she has made such vile use of these billions that to-day
almost nothing remains. There is no question of reimbursement. Russia
is not a mortgaged property subject to payment of interest, which can
be sold when this interest is not promptly forthcoming on the day it
is due. However, we shall be able to collect our money in another
way, simply by taking in exchange for these credits the territories
of the Poles in Posnania, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia; of the
Lithuanians on the banks of the Niemen; of the Letts on the Duna; of
the Esthonians on the Embach and the regions bordering on the rivers
of the northern coastal country; of the Czechs in Bohemia, Austrian
Silesia, and Moravia; of the Slavs in Southern Ukrainia, Carinthia,
Styria, Croatia, Dalmatia, Goerz, and Gradiska, in so far as they
come within the southern and eastern limits of Greater Germany.
‘This procedure enables us to kill three birds with one stone. Russia
rids herself of the burden of debts and interest-paying which is
crushing her; the Slavs of the West and South become citizens of a
Slavic country; and we Germans obtain, free of debt and incumbrance,
the much-needed territories for colonization.’
These words were written in 1911. On May 24, 1917, the Berlin
_Tägliche Rundschau_ thus exposed Germany’s future attitude toward
Russia:—
‘If we reach an agreement with the new Russian government, or
with the government which succeeds it, so much the better; but in
making our terms we shall deliberately turn to account the internal
situation of the ancient empire now in revolution. It is more
essential to-day than ever before that we should push our claims
against Russia for indemnity and for the annexation of that territory
which we so sorely need for colonization.’
The similarity between this programme of annexation and indemnity,
written so recently, and Tannenberg’s outline, published six years
ago, is indeed striking.
Let us now see how, in the present state of affairs, Tannenberg’s
plan for a transfer of credit could be worked out. Suppose we suggest
a hypothesis.
In the first place, it is evident that, if Russia should continue to
submit to anarchy fostered by German agents, her financial situation,
already perilous, would no longer permit her to pay the interest
on her bonds held abroad. Again, if Pan-Germany, now momentarily
established, continues to exist, Berlin will be able to take over
Russian obligations to France without the necessity of a formal
treaty. In fact, the tremendous pressure against Russia, exerted by
the mere geographical contact of Pan-Germany as she lies athwart
Europe, would practically render unnecessary the formal cession of
French credit. Berlin, taking fullest advantage of the situation,
would then say to Petrograd, ‘We consider that France owes us a
considerable sum by way of war-indemnity. We are unable to collect
this, but you Russians also owe an indemnity. We therefore assume
the position of France as your creditor, and, as the strength of
Pan-Germany has put you practically at our mercy, we demand the
payment of your debts in such and such a form.’
What resistance could disorganized Russia make to this claim,
presented with true German cynicism?
Russian extremists need not hope, as certain of them do, to avoid
paying the debts contracted by the old régime. If they do not care to
fulfill their obligations to France, which is working hard to sustain
the Russian Revolution, they will have to pay those same debts to
Berlin, where full use would be made of them to exploit the Russian
people.
Moreover, the ‘purchase’ of French- and English-owned railroads in
Turkey, suggested several months ago by Berlin, of which we have
already spoken, proves convincingly that the Germans intend also
to follow out the system of transferring credits in cases where
money is owed by Germany’s allies to Germany’s enemies. For a long
period great numbers of Frenchmen purchased the state obligations
of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey. It is
impossible to give the exact amount of French money thus invested
in Pan-Germanized Central and Eastern Europe, for the securities
of the above-mentioned countries were generally floated in several
foreign financial centres at once; but persons who have the most
thorough knowledge of French investments make a minimum estimate of
six billion francs. As for the French money invested in Roumania and
Serbia it will vanish into thin air as soon as the Austro-German
conquests are consolidated. As for investments in Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, the assumption by Germany of French
credits—supposing peace to be concluded on the basis of the present
war-map—would be easily accomplished if she reasoned as follows with
her allies:—
‘France now owes you war indemnities which you cannot collect. By
putting them down against the obligations owed by you to France,
you cancel this debt. However, we Germans have lent you during the
war great sums, and furnished you with supplies without which you
could never have continued the struggle. Since you cannot meet these
obligations we shall secure ourselves, in part at least, by assuming
France’s position as your creditor.’
On the whole, if the present state of things were to continue,
Berlin, by the process of transferring credit, would be able to cause
France the very considerable loss of about 15 billion francs owed
her by Russia, and 6 billions owed by Germany’s vassal states—a total
of at least 21 billions. Now that the Pan-German scheme has for the
moment been accomplished, we can truthfully say that 21 billions
of French money, at the lowest estimate, represented by Russia,
Austrian, Hungarian, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Turkish securities, have
been virtually Pan-Germanized.
CHAPTER III
THE NECESSITY FOR A DECISION
In the preceding chapters I have pointed out that the advantages
which Germany has already gained through the war, or has assured for
herself in the future, if the present situation remains essentially
unchanged, consist of seven chief elements. Before we arrive at final
conclusions concerning these elements, let us establish the following
facts:—
1. In three years of war, Germany has spent on the war 1612 francs
per capita of her population. France, in the same period, has spent
2200 francs per capita—that is to say, 608 francs, or the immense
figure of 38 per cent, more than Germany.
If the formula ‘without indemnity’ be adopted, with respect to the
expenses of the war, far indeed from serving the cause of the Right,
it would result in this unspeakable iniquity: each Frenchman who
desired peace would have to bear a financial burden heavier by more
than a third than that of each German and loyal subject of the Kaiser
who loosed the dogs of war. Therefore this enormous difference—38
per cent—in the per capita war-expenses between France and
Germany would in itself suffice to make the economic—and hence the
political—downfall of France, swift, complete, inevitable, and beyond
recall.
2. Unquestionably Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, _as
separate states_, have been ruined by their war-expenses, but this
ruin is all to the advantage of Germany, as it throws her vassals
into a condition of absolute financial dependence. As a result, if
Pan-Germany is to continue to exist, the Berlin government must be
the unchallenged controller of all the financial combinations on
which the peace and well-being of Pan-Germany depend. Now these
combinations evidently can serve only to strengthen the German
hegemony.
No parallel situation is to be found among the Entente powers. The
ruin of Russia, for example, would simply make the ruin of France
more inevitable, unless a decisive victory of the Allies were to
rob Germany of her iniquitous spoils and at the same time guarantee
to France the legitimate reparation which alone can save her from
irretrievable financial disaster.
3. If Germany can still continue to float new internal loans with
comparative ease, it is because her wholesale territorial and
Pan-German seizures are considered by her people as new pledges of
the credit of the German state as the heart of Pan-Germany.
4. France, which has spent in three years of war 2500 francs per
capita of her population, has suffered only loss: 20,000 square
kilometres of her territory have been invaded, and given over to
undreamed-of spoliation at German hands. Germany, on the other hand,
which has spent only 1691 francs per capita for the war, has occupied
500,000 square kilometres of foreign soil, burglarized her own
allies, and piled up huge profits from the war.
The diversity of these profits is so great, and the mortgage that
they have placed on the future is so heavy, that no figures will
convey the sum-total of these advantages; but enough has been said to
show that the aggregate is enormous. If one deducts the 115 billions
of francs devoted by Germany to the war from the total represented
by all the elements of advantage already enumerated, one begins
to realize that Germany has really wrung from the war present and
future profits which can be computed only in _hundreds of billions of
francs_. This war, therefore, has brought Germany boundless material
gain, such as no war in history has ever brought to one people. It
is equally certain, on the other hand, that Germany can utilize her
advantages only on the express condition of maintaining certain
indispensable conditions of the situation on which they are based. We
shall now see to what minimum these conditions may be reduced.
Our table shows that out of the seven elements of advantage won by
Germany from the war, the last six—that is, those in the second
group—are altogether independent of the first, except for one
small detail relating to the national fortunes of the territories
occupied by Germany to the southeast—that is, in Albania, Montenegro,
Roumania, and Serbia.
If, therefore, the formula, ‘peace without annexations and
indemnities,’ were actually adopted, Germany, by withdrawing from
Belgium and France to the west, Russian Poland to the east, and
Montenegro, Albania, Roumania, and Serbia to the southeast, would
renounce her first element of advantage, represented by the value of
the invaded territories—that is, about 155 billion francs. From this,
however, must be deducted the tens of billions’ worth of plunder
carried out of the invaded territories during these three years,
consisting either of products already used up by the Germans, or of
material, metals, and securities which have already been removed to
Germany. Her renunciation of this first element of advantage would
therefore be rendered relatively incomplete were the formula adopted.
We should note also that there are excellent reasons why Germany’s
renunciation could never apply in reality to the territories invaded
by her to the southeast—_to Serbia, at all events_.
The six elements of German advantage forming the second group of
our table are infinitely more important to Berlin than the first
element—which is in any case partially assured by the ‘no indemnity’
formula, as we have seen. Although they are less directly apparent
to the Allies, the six elements of the second group are nevertheless
_real_, for they depend on incontrovertible military, economic, and
geographic facts. Now these six elements, big with possibilities
for the future, depend entirely on the covert but certain seizure
which the war has enabled Germany to make of her own allies. But
this seizure was possible only as a result of Serbia’s destruction.
Serbia, therefore, formed the geographic bulkhead which Germany had
to batter down before her influence could predominate over Bulgaria
and Turkey. The destruction of Serbia was the _sine qua non_ of the
establishment of Central Pan-Germany, which assures the Kaiser of the
six principal elements of advantage from the war. Moreover, it is
undeniable that the essential prop of Central Pan-Germany has been
furnished by the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad, of which the most important
branch, that of Belgrade-Nish-Pirot, runs across Serbia. Now, that
Germany is fighting for the Berlin-Bagdad line, Count Karoly, an ally
of Berlin, admitted, speaking on December 12, 1916, in the Hungarian
Chamber. (See _Le Journal de Genève_, December 30, 1916.)
To sum up, then, German victory and the fruition of her most
important war-advantages depend directly on the maintenance of
Central Pan-Germany, made up of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia,
Bulgaria, and Turkey. Now this maintenance is based on two prime
conditions.
1. The continuance of Serbia’s state of subjection to Austro-Germany.
2. The preservation of the new economic and military lines of
communication between Berlin on the one side and Vienna, Budapest,
Sofia, and Constantinople on the other. These are, indeed, the
bonds which have enabled Berlin to reduce to practical slavery
the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians,—the adversaries of
Pan-Germany,—and then, without changing any names or long-established
frontiers, to make Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria vassal-states of
Berlin, and, consequently, active elements of Central Pan-Germany.
Finally, if the present order of things in Central Europe is
preserved, Germany can maintain the Hamburg-Bagdad line. This would
be assured by the adoption of the formula, ‘peace without indemnities
and annexations.’ This is easily proved.
As we have already seen, even if Germany were to withdraw in the
East and West, the stipulation ‘no indemnities’ would permit her to
give back the territories stolen from Russia, France, Belgium, and
Roumania in a condition of complete economic, physical, and moral
collapse: in a word, sucked dry. By reason, too, of the principle of
‘no indemnities,’ the reconstruction of these devastated countries
would be another cause of financial exhaustion for France, Russia,
Belgium, and Roumania, already overburdened with the costs of the
war. But, even assuming that the Germans withdraw from these occupied
territories to the East and West,—although at present there is no
reason for seriously considering such an eventuality,—no one in his
senses could believe that they would give up Serbia unless forced
to do so by the most ruthless methods; for Serbia, by reason of her
geographic position, is absolutely essential to the existence of
Central Pan-Germany, on which, in turn, Germany’s vast advantages
depend.
Of course, it is easy to imagine that Germany would give her
signature to treaties of settlement, even involving Serbia. But
treaties signed by Germany have no value whatever. ‘We snap our
fingers at treaties,’ said the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin to
Mr. Gerard, American Ambassador at Berlin. Besides, even supposing
that Berlin were party to a treaty concerning Serbia, this treaty
might allow Serbia to exist in theory, but not in fact. We must
look the situation in the face: Serbia is one great graveyard. Her
population has been systematically butchered by the Bulgarians, with
German approval. Serbia is utterly ruined: the Bulgaro-Austro-Germans
have taken everything.
Now the principle ‘no indemnities’ would keep Serbia in this terrible
and irremediable state of misery. It is evident that under these
conditions the Serbian state would be hopelessly crippled. If,
therefore, Austria-Germany were to say to the Allies, ‘Very well; in
conformity with the formula “no annexations, no indemnities,” we are
willing to recognize Serbia’s dependence by treaty,’ who would be
deceived by this sinister and portentous joke? Who could believe in
the sincerity of a proposition which, on the face of it, is rendered
impossible of fulfillment by the ‘no indemnities’ clause. And what
guaranty would the Allies hold that Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria
would withdraw from Serbia at the same time, in view of the fact that
such a withdrawal, if _bona fide_, would imply Berlin’s renunciation
of the whole Central Pan-German scheme and its vast attendant profits?
To suppose such a thing possible implies a complete ignorance of the
Germanic spirit as it has manifested itself since the beginning of
history. Besides, declarations made by the Germans themselves show
that they will never recede from their position as regards Serbia.
As early as December, 1916, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ prepared
its readers in advance for the ‘pacifist’ tactics about to be
employed—tactics which are now being tried out with the help of the
Russian anarchists, the Kienthal Socialists, and the Pope.
‘Certainly,’ said the Frankfort paper, ‘if we are to make a lasting
profit from the military situation, both in its favorable and in its
less advantageous aspects, it is essential that special questions
should be severally considered in their relation to the whole.
To-day our point of view should be as follows: in the East, the
formulation of definite demands, and in the West, negotiations on a
flexible basis. This is not a programme but a general line of action.
“Negotiation” is by no means a synonym for “renunciation.”’
This last sentence should be read and pondered over by all the
Allies. Here we find an absolutely clear statement as regards the
fate of Serbia, whose restoration, by means indicated later, is the
one thing which can save the world from the consequences of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme.
On August 8, 1917, at a banquet given at London for M. Pachitch,
the Serbian Premier, Mr. Lloyd George acknowledged in decisive
terms Great Britain’s obligations to Serbia—obligations which are
practically those of the whole Entente.
‘What I have already said in the name of the British Government
regarding Belgium, I here repeat in the name of the same Government
regarding Serbia. The first condition of peace must be its complete
and unrestricted restoration. I have not come here to make a speech.
I have simply come to say that, no matter how long the war should
last, Britain has pledged her honor that Serbia shall emerge from
the conflict independent and completely restored. Moreover, it is
not only a matter of honor. The security of civilization is directly
involved here. In the West, Belgium has blocked Germany’s way, and
Serbia in the East has been the check of the Central Powers. She must
continue to mount guard over the gateway to the East.’
To this the Berlin _Kreuzzeitung_ made reply,—
‘Mr. Lloyd George has said that the integral restoration of Serbia
was an essential condition of peace and that British honor was
pledged to this restoration. The war-aims of England and those of
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria are in absolute opposition on this
point.’
The _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_, speaking for Germany as well, added,—
‘Germany and Austria-Hungary have crushed Serbia. They alone will
decide what disposition is to be made of King Peter’s former realm.’
There can be no illusion here. The formula ‘peace without annexations
and indemnities’ cannot apply to Serbia, which is the keystone of
Pan-Germany.
We now see that, even if the withdrawal of Germany from the
territories of Belgium, France, and Russia now held by her were to
take place, Central Pan-Germany would remain essentially intact;
and her commercial competition alone would suffice to bring about
the economic ruin of France, England, and Russia. The last-named
countries would be staggering under their colossal war-debts,
with no offsetting compensation, whereas Germany, thanks to six
great elements of advantage, would find her war-losses more than
counterbalanced by her profits. What chance would the Allied powers,
exhausted by a deadly peace, have against the thirty million soldiers
of Pan-Germany, when Berlin, refreshed by a short respite, should
choose to renew her hold over those western territories which she had
temporarily relinquished?
Is it not plain what depths of deception lie beneath that formula,
‘peace without annexations and indemnities,’ which the Russian
Socialists, ignorant of the vast advantages accruing to Germany from
the war, have adopted at the suggestion of Berlin’s Leninist agents?
Let us look at the facts, not at the words. If the formula ‘peace
without annexations and indemnities’ is acceptable to the Germans, it
is simply because this formula, in the opinion of Berlin, will assure
the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany, which, in turn, pledges to
Germany the domination of Europe and the fulfillment of all other
elements of the Pan-German scheme.
Now, if Central Pan-Germany were to survive, thus assuring to Germany
all its vast attendant advantages, and leaving the Allies to face
their incalculable war-losses, could such a peace properly be called
a ‘white peace’? Could a peace which gave Germany the domination of
Europe be called a ‘drawn game,’ a ‘peace without annexations or
indemnities’? What sort of ‘limping peace’ (_paix boiteuse_) would
permit Prussian militarism to hold sway over the 150 million people
of Pan-Germany instead of the 68 millions of 1914, and put 30 million
soldiers at Berlin’s disposal? What one of the exhausted states of
Europe could lift a hand under such conditions? This would be no
_paix boiteuse_; it would be the peace of slavery.
If the Allies are to understand the crucial situation which lies
before them, they must realize that, as Lloyd George said, ‘The
security of civilization is directly involved in the independence
of Serbia.’ But the independence of Serbia can never be assured so
long as Germany practically exercises hegemony over the 50 million
people of Austria-Hungary, for the Austro-German unit of 118 million
inhabitants, all subject to Berlin, is geographically the mistress
of the Balkans. _The pledge of Serbia’s independence, therefore,
does not lie in Serbia, but north of the Danube._ This pledge
involves the liberation of the peoples under Hapsburg domination,—the
Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians,—which alone can
permit the creation of a barrier sufficiently strong to block the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf line, and, at the same time, annul the vast
advantages that the definite establishment of the formidable economic
and military Pan-German scheme would assure to the Kaiser and his
people.
Now it is much easier to devise the destruction of Pan-Germany than
is generally supposed. This fact will become plain as soon as the
Allies as a whole realize that the freedom of the nationalities
subject to the Hapsburgs should not only be an object of the Entente
victory, but also a means to that victory. This, however, is a matter
which needs greater elaboration than I can give it at this point. It
is discussed at length in the concluding chapters of this volume.
In a word, the solution of the Central European problem means
everything for the Allies. So long as it shall remain unsolved,
victory will be out of their reach. On the other hand, when this one
point has been settled, all the other special war-aims of each of the
Allies can be fulfilled with ease.
Assuming now that the problem of Central Europe has been solved,
could it be said that the resulting peace would be ‘without
annexations and indemnities’? Plainly not: for this peace, if it is
to break up forever the autocracies of the Central Empires, must,
for reasons of nationality, change the existing frontiers, which
have made Austro-German imperialism possible. It might involve also
certain legitimate reparations. Can it be said that peace on the
terms of the Allies would be a ‘white peace’—a ‘drawn game’? Again
we must say no; for such a peace would bring incalculable benefits
to the world: the end of Prussian militarism, together with the
possibility of organizing the society of nations under other and
better conditions. Neither could it be called a ‘_paix boiteuse_,’
for the destruction of Prussian militarism would insure to the world
a long term of rest after the present awful struggle.
The formulæ ‘peace without indemnities or annexations,’ ‘white
peace,’ ‘drawn game’ and ‘_paix boiteuse_’ have therefore no more
connection with reality in the event of an Allied victory than in
that of a German victory. The truth in a nutshell is that, by virtue
of the prime importance of the Central European problem, either the
Allies will win victory through the destruction of Pan-Germany, or
else the Germans, thanks to Central Pan-Germany and its economic and
military advantages, will reduce all Europe to slavery. These are the
two phases of the dilemma.
In any case, the fact that expressions without any practical
application, and hence absurd, are constantly made use of in many
Allied organs of public opinion in the discussion of peace, proves
beyond doubt that certain Allied circles, poisoned by the influence
of Lenine or Kienthal, have lost their sense of realities. With
such insidious enemies as the Germans, this involves a real danger
for that moral resistance of the Allies which is so invaluable.
The Americans, through their practical common sense, can be of the
greatest service in helping the European Allies to set it at naught.
President Wilson, by his message to Russia and his Flag Day address,
has already done much for the common cause by clearly setting forth
the concrete difficulties to be overcome by the Allies if they are
to live at liberty. Mr. Gompers has done the same by his firm stand
regarding the Stockholm conference. By energetically opposing the
pernicious Socialist theoreticians, he has supported those real
Socialists in France, England, and Russia who understand the vital
importance of killing Prussian militarism.
May all true Americans continue to speak as these two men have done!
The common sense of their opinions, spread broadcast among the
European Allies, will help us to neutralize the deadly action of
those among us who have become intoxicated by theories. The cause of
the Allies is an ideal, but the triumph of this ideal can never be
insured by words; it can be compassed only by the accurate knowledge
of military and economic realities.
CHAPTER IV
THE ALLIES AND PAN-GERMANISM
It is now twenty years that I have worked tirelessly to tear the veil
from the Pan-German scheme, which my investigations in all parts of
the world have enabled me to unearth. In spite of the positive and
abundant proofs of its existence which I have been publishing for
nineteen years, I was unable to persuade the responsible authorities
in France, Russia, or England, that a formidable peril was swiftly
and more swiftly drawing near. Paris and London were steeped in
blind pacifist delusions. As for Petrograd, the sinister Teutonic
influences which, until only yesterday, were at work on the highest
personages, prevented the great Russian people from knowing the real
nature of Germany’s projects.
If the Europeans most directly interested in knowing the truth were,
until the very outbreak of hostilities, completely hoodwinked as to
the true intentions of William II, it is only natural that Americans
should take some time to realize the staggering facts concerning the
fantastic and odious plan of world-domination so toilsomely built
up by the government at Berlin. In peace times, too, the affairs of
old Europe, especially the intricate tangle of Austro-Hungarian and
Balkan politics, had no practical interest for so vast and remote
a nation as the United States. This was particularly true of her
Western citizens. To-day, however, Americans as well as French,
British, Russians, and Italians, are faced with the obligation of
mastering the problems of Central European affairs; for, without
exaggeration, it is on the proper solution of these problems that the
independent existence of the United States depends.
As events have justified the views I have held for a score of years,
I trust my American readers will hold this fact in my favor. If I
should seem to run counter to the ideas they now hold, they should
realize that I do so deliberately, in order to save priceless time
and better serve their own legitimate interests.
I
The present situation in Europe is due to two factors: first, the
almost complete fulfillment by the Germans of a plan which they
had long been preparing with the utmost care; second, the repeated
mistakes of the Allies in their carrying on of the war—mistakes which
alone have permitted the Germans to consummate their plan almost
without opposition.
The Pan-Germanist programme of 1911 called for the establishment
of Prussian hegemony over a territory of nearly 4,015,000 square
kilometres—in other words, besides actual conquest in the
East and West, it meant the indirect, yet effective seizure of
Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey. At the beginning of
1917—before the capture of Bagdad by the English and the strategic
retreat of the German troops in the West—the programme had been
realized to the extent of 3,600,000 square kilometres—that is, in
nine-tenths of its entirety.
The basic explanation of this achievement lies partly in the fact
that, if the Germans are outlaws they are very intelligent outlaws,
perfectly trained for the task of seizing the booty on which they
have set their hearts; partly in the fact that the leaders of the
Allies, intelligent and animated by the best intentions though they
are, have been quite unenlightened as to the multiple realities of
the European tangle, a thoroughgoing knowledge of which is absolutely
necessary for the conduct of the terrible war in progress.
The proof of this ignorance lies in the recognized truth that the
heads of the European states now in league against Germany were,
without exception, taken by surprise when war broke out. Posterity
will look on this fact with amazement. The governments of the Allies
were no better prepared to direct the war intellectually than were
their generals to carry it on materially. Now, the intellectual
prosecution of this war presents unprecedented difficulties: it
calls uncompromisingly for a detailed knowledge, not only of
matters military and naval, but of geographic, ethnographic,
economic, and political questions which, by reason of the scale of
the present conflict, react profoundly on all military operations
of general scope. As a result of this interpenetration of all the
various problems, the world-conflict is not, as many people still
believe, a purely military struggle, in which the mere machinery
of war plays a decisive role. In spite of appearances, mind—that
is, the intellectual element—dominates the material element which,
though indispensable, can attain full effectiveness only when it
is employed in furtherance of a definite plan of action, backed by
clear thinking; and such a plan can never be formulated unless the
ethnographic, psychological, economic, and geographic factors capable
of affecting every great movement of a general strategic nature are
calculated as carefully as the purely military factors. By reason
of the potency of these many factors—invisible, but very real and
powerful—it may be said: ‘This war is not a mere war of armaments—it
is a war of political science.’
It is because the strategists of Berlin have long recognized
this conception of modern warfare; it is because they have at
their fingers’ ends a documentation of political science, slowly
accumulated and of unquestionable worth, that they are in a position
to meet endless problems as they present themselves, and to
achieve successes against the Allies which, on the surface, appear
incomprehensible.
As for the leaders of the Allies, it seems as if many of them are
not alive to the element of political science in the war, even at
the present moment. The reason is simple. The same men who ignored
the realities of Pan-Germanism before the war are, naturally enough,
unable to grasp the politico-scientific, geographic, economic,
ethnographic, and psychological realities of all Europe now that the
conflict has burst on us. In the realm of the intellectual there
can be no improvisation. To master the politico-scientific elements
necessary for the prosecution of this war, there is need of minds
trained by the unremitting application of fifteen or twenty years.
Among the leaders of the Entente no man is to be found who has bent
his will to such intellectual effort; and the pressing problems
brought forth by each day give no time for minute, deliberate study
by the men who have succeeded to the seats of power since war began.
II
The capital mistakes in the prosecution of the war committed by the
Entente proceed directly from the defective equipment of its leaders
which I have just pointed out. They explain the difference in the
results obtained by the two groups of belligerents, although the
courage and self-sacrifice of the Allies’ soldiers are as great
as those of the Germans. They explain, too, why the three hundred
millions of the Allies—this takes no account of their colonial
resources or of the support drawn from trans-oceanic neutrals—have
not yet succeeded in defeating Germany, which entered the war with a
population of sixty-eight millions and one ally, Austria-Hungary, of
whose thirty million people three quarters were directly antagonistic
to Berlin.
These capital mistakes made by the Allies are as follows. They
believed that a friendly agreement with Bulgaria was possible,
although that country was treaty-bound to Berlin and Constantinople
long before the war. They cherished illusions concerning King
Constantine, who, above all else, was brother-in-law of the Kaiser.
They organized the Dardanelles expedition, which should never have
been attempted. Even if this operation had been judged technically
feasible, its futility would have been apparent if the Allies
had realized—and it was their arch-error not to realize—that the
strategic key to the whole European war was the Danube. The mere
occupation by the Allies of the territory stretching from Montenegro
through Serbia to Roumania, would have resolved all the essential
problems of the conflict. Cut off from the Central Empires, Bulgaria
and Turkey, whose arsenals were depleted by the Balkan disturbances
of 1912-1913, would have found it impossible to make a strong stand
against the Allies. Turkey, who had been imprudent enough to defy
them, would have been obliged to open the Straits within a very short
time, for sheer lack of munitions to defend them. This opening of the
Straits would have been effected by a strong pressure by the Allies
on the south of Hungary. Moreover, by the same action the Central
Empires would have been barred from reinforcements and supplies from
the Orient. Germany, finding herself cut off on land in the South as
she was blockaded by sea in the North, would have been obliged to
come to terms.
Unhappily, the general staffs of the Allies in the West were not
prepared to grasp the politico-scientific character of the war,
especially the cardinal importance of the economic factor. This
ignorance remained unenlightened until Roumania was crushed in
1916. As a result, for twenty-seven months the Balkans were looked
on by the leaders in the West as being of only secondary military
importance. During these twenty-seven months the Allies were obsessed
by the idea that they would vanquish Germany on the Western front by
a war of attrition. This conviction delayed the Saloniki-Belgrade
expedition, and when it was finally undertaken, it was on too small
a scale to insure success. Such a grave error would never have been
committed by the Allied strategists if they had fully realized that
the principal objective of the Pan-German scheme, for the attainment
of which Germany was primarily fighting, was the seizure of the
Orient. This point of view, however, was for a long time ignored, in
spite of the tireless efforts made by a few to demonstrate its vital
importance.
The Austro-Germans, profiting by this basic mistake of the civil and
military chiefs of the Entente, were able in October-November, 1915,
to join hands with Bulgaria and Turkey over the corpse of Serbia.
From that time on, the General Staff at Berlin has been profiting by
this situation, improving it and consolidating it by seizing half of
Roumania toward the close of 1916. The direct result of the mistakes
of the Allies, coupled with the methodical procedure of Berlin, has
been the realization of nine tenths of Pan-Germany.
This Pan-Germany is composed of two elements. First, the great
occupied territories taken by Germany from Belgium, France, Russia,
Serbia, and Roumania. Second, the practical seizure effected by her
at the expense of her own allies: Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey; for, as a matter of fact, the Quadruple Alliance is nothing
but a great illusion carefully fostered by the Kaiser for the purpose
of concealing the true situation from the neutrals—particularly the
United States, which was then in that category. If one wishes to see
things as they are, one must realize that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Turkey are _not_ the allies—that is, the equals—of Germany. These
three states are practically the vassals of Berlin, in whose sight
they count for scarcely more than Saxony or Bavaria. The principal
proof of this state of affairs lies in the fact that the Kaiser
wields an uncontested supremacy from Hamburg to the British front at
Bagdad.
Since the beginning of hostilities there has been a formidable
extension of Prussian militarism. At first, it held in its grasp only
the sixty-eight million people of the German Empire. By April, 1915,
it had extended and organized its influence among the thirty millions
of Austro-Hungarians, who until that time had taken orders from their
own independent military chiefs. After October-November, 1915,—the
date of Serbia’s downfall,—the Prussian system reached out to
Bulgaria and Turkey. By taking account of these extensions and adding
together the populations of the territories occupied by Germany,
together with those of her infatuated allies, one finds that to-day
Prussian militarism no longer controls sixty-eight million souls, as
at the beginning of the war, but about one hundred and seventy-six
million European and Ottoman subjects.
This is the brutal, overwhelming fact which Americans must face if
they wish to learn the sole solution of the war which will assure to
them, as well as to the rest of the world, a durable peace.
The following figures will show how the three groups of the
population of Pan-Germany were divided at the beginning of 1917:—
1. THE MASTERS
Germans 73,000,000
2. THE VASSALS
Magyars 10,000,000 }
Bulgars 5,000,000 } 21,000,000
Turks 6,000,000 }
3. THE SLAVES
French (about) 3,000,000 }
Belgians 7,500,000 }
Alsatians, Lorrainers 1,500,000 }
Danes 200,000 }
Poles, Lithuanians 22,000,000 }
Ruthenians 5,500,000 }
Czechs 8,500,000 } 82,000,000
Jugo-Slavs 11,000,000 }
Roumanians 8,000,000 }
Italians 800,000 }
Armenians 2,000,000 }
Levantines 2,000,000 }
Ottoman Greeks 2,000,000 }
Arabs 8,000,000 }
———————————
_Total_ 176,000,000
To sum up, seventy-three million Germans rule over twenty-one million
vassals and eighty-two million slaves,—Latin, Slavic, Semitic,
belonging to thirteen different nationalities,—who are bearing the
most cruel and unjustifiable yoke that the world has ever known.
It is undeniable, moreover, that each extension of Prussian
militarism over a new territory has enabled Germany to prolong the
struggle by obtaining new supplies of food, new reinforcements
to press into her service and territory to exploit, new civil
populations, whose labor is made use of even in works of a military
nature. As a result, the technical problem now confronting the
Allies in Europe is, through the mistakes of their former leaders,
infinitely more complicated than at the outbreak of hostilities.
To-day Berlin, by means of Prussian terrorism methodically and
pitilessly employed, disposes of the military and economic resources
of one hundred and seventy-six million people, occupying a strategic
position in the centre of Europe which is all to her profit. It is
this very state of things, founded on the slavery of eighty-two
millions of human beings, which is intolerable.
III
Many times, and rightly, the Allies have declared that it was not
their object to exterminate the German people and bring about their
political extinction. On the other hand, it is just and essential
to proclaim that Pan-Germany must be destroyed. On this depends the
liberty, not only of Europe, but of the whole world. This is the
point of view which, in the crisis of to-day, should prevail with
Americans, for the following reasons. Suppose that Pan-Germany were
able to maintain itself in its present position. It cannot be denied
that its territory contains considerable latent military and economic
resources, as well as strategic positions of world-significance,
like the Dardanelles. If these resources were freely exploited
and developed to their highest pitch by the relentless organizing
spirit of Berlin, Prussianized Pan-Germany, dividing Europe in two,
would dominate the Continent, uncontestably and indefinitely, by
means of her crushing strength. France, Russia, England, Italy,
ceasing to exist as great powers, could only submit to Germany’s
will. And Berlin, mistress of Europe, would soon realize, not
merely the Hamburg-Bagdad and Antwerp-Bagdad railways, but the
Brest-Bagdad line as well; for Brest has long been coveted secretly
by the Pan-Germanists, who would make of it the great military and
commercial transatlantic port of Prussianized Europe.
Moreover, if Germany achieved the ruin of the Allies, it is entirely
probable that the General Staff of William II would launch a
formidable expedition against the United States without delay, in
order to allow her no time to organize herself against the Prussian
tyranny hypothetically dominating Europe. Even if Berlin felt it
necessary to defer this step, Americans would none the less be forced
to prepare for the inevitable struggle and to serve an apprenticeship
to militarism which would be odious to them. If Americans, then,
see things as they really are, and perceive the dangers to which
they are pledging their future, they will be convinced that they,
as much as Europeans, have a vital interest in the annihilation of
Pan-Germanism. In a word, it is clear that any peril accruing to the
United States from Europe can arise only from so formidable a power
as Pan-Germany, and not from a Germany kept within her legitimate
frontiers, and forced to behave herself, by the balance of other
powers.
We must also realize that the moral considerations at stake are a
matter of the liveliest interest to the United States. Can republican
America allow the feudal spirit which kindled the torch of this war
to triumph over the world? This spirit is made up of the following
elements: the feudalism of the Prussian Junkers, chief prop and
stay of the Hohenzollerns; the feudalism of the great Austrian
land-owners; the feudalism of the Magyar grandees, whose caste-spirit
is precisely the same as that of the Prussian lordlings; and the
Turkish feudalism of Enver Bey and his friends. In other words,
this four-ply feudal spirit which is the basis of Pan-Germany is
in radical and absolute opposition to the democratic spirit of the
modern world. Granting for a moment that Germany were victorious,
Russia, after a frightful reign of anarchy, would be forced to submit
once more to the yoke of autocracy. As for the peoples of Western
Europe, reduced to worse than slavery, they could only renounce their
dearest ideals—the ideals for which they have shed their blood for
centuries.
The present war, then, is manifestly a struggle _à outrance_ between
democracy and feudalism. To Americans as well as to Europeans falls
the task, not only of preserving their corporeal independence, but of
saving our common civilization. This can be accomplished only by the
destruction of Pan-Germanism.
It is plain that Berlin, failing so far to crush the Allies
completely, is bending every effort to maintaining Pan-Germany in
its present position, so that, after peace is declared, it may
crystallize and swiftly develop its full power. When, in December,
1916, President Wilson requested the belligerents to make known
the causes for which they were fighting, the government of Berlin
issued no definite statement. The reason for this attitude is plain.
If Berlin still hopes to enforce her outrageous pretensions by her
immense military power, she cannot possibly put down her terms in
black and white, in a document subject to general perusal, without
instantly calling down on her head the blazing reprobation of the
civilized world.
The Allies, on the contrary, replied to Mr. Wilson’s question easily
and with precision.
The universal attention drawn to this reply has entailed advantages
and disadvantages. By the very nature of things, the Allies
definitely announced that the smaller nationalities in Turkey,
Austria-Hungary, and the Balkans must be set free, thus implying a
radical opposition to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf idea. This has enabled
Berlin, for one thing, to bind her accomplices at Vienna, Budapest,
Sofia, and Constantinople more closely, if possible, to her cause,
and also to galvanize for a still longer period the forces of the
German people, who are resolved to endure the bitterest suffering in
order to insure, after peace comes, the immense advantages accruing
from the _fait accompli_ of Pan-Germanism.
By way of compensation for this, the publicity given the reply of
the Allies has accomplished two excellent ends. First of all, it has
permitted every one to see that the common purpose of the Allies is
to solve the Central European problem, which, as a matter of fact,
is not only of European, but of universal interest, since such a
solution puts a quietus on German dreams of world-domination. This
publicity, too, has made it possible to compare the principles
invoked by the Allies in their peace-terms with those of President
Wilson, proclaimed in his message to the Senate on January 22, 1917,
and to establish the fact that these principles are identical.
IV
The reason for this harmonious point of view lies in the adoption of
the principle of nationality by the Allies and by President Wilson
as the fundamental basis for the reconstruction of the Europe of
to-morrow. Because of this point in common, it is evident that the
war measures of the Allies and the pacific endeavors of Mr. Wilson
have in view the same general geographic solutions of the problem
of organizing Europe on the lines of a durable peace. This is a
fact of the utmost importance, as I tried to show with the aid
of maps in an article in _L’Illustration_, of February 27, 1917.
Allies and Americans, then, may join hands and press resolutely
ahead,—especially since the Russian Revolution has come to pass,—for,
with a common ideal, their general practical solutions for meeting
this formidable crisis cannot but be identical.
In order to understand fully the seriousness of the situation, one
must distinguish clearly between the moral position of the Allies and
the strategic positions of the two groups of belligerents. The moral
position of the Allies is excellent. After Washington and Peking
broke with Berlin, and especially after the magnificent revolution
in Russia, after Bagdad fell and a fraction of the invaded French
territory was won back, the spirit of the Allies was all that could
be desired. But even while recognizing the excellence of this moral
strength and its potentialities of success, we must first of all
consider the general strategic situation. The events of this war have
plainly shown that, unfortunately, brute force in the service of the
lowest passions can prevail over the holiest rights, the purest
aspirations. Since August, 1914, incontestable rights have been
violated, and noble nations martyrized.
Let us face the cruel truth and say: the Allies may yet be completely
vanquished if certain developments come about, or if new strategic
mistakes are added to those portentous ones which nearly lost them
the fight, in spite of the righteousness of their cause and their
immense, if badly employed, latent resources. If we wish, then,
really to understand the crisis of to-day and the mighty peril which
still menaces the world’s liberty, we must not shrink from meeting
the realities of the military situation. We must be ready to face the
most serious developments that can be conceived. Such an attitude
implies, not pessimism, but that readiness for the worst which lies
at the root of military wisdom.
Let us now accept the following facts. The troops of France are
beginning to be exhausted. The iniquitous administration of the Tsar
had seriously compromised the provisioning of the Russian army with
food and munitions. In that vast country, where conditions were ripe
for idealistic extremists to guide the revolution toward pacifism or
anarchy, there are alarming symptoms of the prevalence of the latter
condition. The swarming agents of Germany are working there without
respite. If their efforts shall finally succeed, the strength of
Russia will swiftly dissolve. This would practically insure a German
victory, for, with the Russian armies demoralized, all the forces
of Pan-Germany could be flung against the Franco-British front.
Moreover, if, from the moral standpoint, the Berlin government is
universally to be despised, the same cannot be said about her general
technical military ability, whose elements are as follows.
Berlin is incontestably mistress of Pan-Germany—that is, she has
absolute disposal of vast resources in men and in the manifold
products of a great territory with a population of one hundred
and seventy-six millions. The Kaiser’s Great General Staff, whose
intellectual resourcefulness cannot be questioned, is quick to make
the most of every lesson taught by the war. The annual levies of
men from the various territories of Pan-Germany certainly outnumber
the losses sustained each year by her troops. It is therefore, in
my opinion, a grave error to assume, as the Allies have done, that
the Germans can be beaten by mere attrition of their forces. By
organizing under one uniform system the soldiery furnished by the
many different countries of Pan-Germany, Prussian militarism has
unquestionably given its troops a cohesion and a unity unknown to the
vassal-allies of Germany before the war. This state of affairs has
undoubtedly added to the military effectiveness of the vast armies
which take their orders from Berlin.
The German military authorities most advantageously employed the
respites given them by the strategic errors of the Allies. Never
have the broad lines of trenches, the far-flung battle frontiers,
been more powerfully guarded than now. Never have the Germans had
more abundant stores of munitions. Never has the network of railways
covering the length and breadth of Pan-Germany been so complete.
Never has the Great General Staff, making full use of its central
position, been better able to concentrate on any front with lightning
speed. For these reasons, it is my opinion that we may safely say
that never before has the Berlin government, from a military point
of view, been so strong. The various statistics which justify such
a conclusion are, I think, to be relied on. Even supposing them to
be exaggerated, it is much better to run the risk of overestimating
the enemy’s strength than to underestimate it. Many of the Allies’
mistakes sprang from neglect of this axiom.
CHAPTER V
MILITARY OPERATIONS
I
As a prelude to the further consideration of certain aspects of the
world-war, I should like, if I may, to quote a few paragraphs which I
printed early last summer, by way of forecast, and which events have
not wholly belied.
Let us now attempt to forecast the German military plans for 1917.
For some weeks persistent reports have been telling of their
tremendous preparations for hurling an offensive against the Russian
front. As for the Franco-British front in the West, it was stated
that the General Staff at Berlin would be glad to hold things
stationary on that side until, after winning the victory on which
they count in the East, they are free to devote their attentions
to the occidental theatre. This project, of course, cannot be
confirmed; but the voluntary shortening of the western line by the
Germans would lend color to its probability. Moreover, such a plan
would coincide perfectly with the present interests of Berlin, with
the habitual methods of the Kaiser’s General Staff, with the broad
Pan-Germanist scheme, and with the personal preferences of Marshal
von Hindenburg. It is natural also that the Germans should avail
themselves of the sinister and undeniable effects of the Russian
imperial administration on the army and civil population of the
country before the new government at Petrograd has time to repair the
all-too-abundant harm that has been wrought.
We must cherish no illusions. As long as it can dispose of the vast
resources of Pan-Germany, which, to my thinking, are still taken too
lightly by the Allies; while the results of the Russian Revolution
are still uncertain; while the reorganization of the Muscovite armies
still remains uncompleted, the government at Berlin, in spite of its
serious problems connected with the food supply, is still convinced
that it can win a decisive military victory by dealing with its
adversaries one by one. And so we should foresee that the German
General Staff will meet its problems in succession.
It seems probable, then, that it will follow the basic principles
of warfare and concentrate all the forces at its disposal against
the weakest front. This, without question, is the Roumano-Russian
line. Its great extent, together with the formidable development
of the German railway system,—infinitely superior to that of the
Russians,—makes it easier to introduce the element of surprise,
which is of capital importance for swift, decisive victory. The
Russians, too, are certainly less well provided with munitions of
war than the Franco-British troops; and the Germans have succeeded in
further weakening them by means of the terrible explosions recently
engineered by their spies at Archangel. As a result of the execrable
administration of the former government, the food situation in Russia
is most critical, while the revolutionists are not yet sure of the
reorganization of the military forces. The Germans, therefore, have
an unquestionable interest in profiting without delay by this state
of affairs.
A vigorous offensive on the Eastern front is also in harmony with the
Pangermanist plan, which for twenty-five years has looked forward
to the seizure by Germany of Riga, Little Russia, and Odessa. And a
German success in the south of Russia would be big with economic,
naval, military, and moral consequences of world-import. The Germans
would become masters of the rich and boundless wheat-lands of Little
Russia, which, from the midst of their food-problems, they watch with
greedy eyes. The capture of Odessa and the complete conquest of the
Black Sea, by means of transports (sent in large numbers down the
Danube, thus permitting surprise attacks at vital points), would end
in the loss of the Crimea and, probably, the fall of the Caucasus
into the hands of the Turco-Germans. The British, then, could no
longer hold out at Bagdad. Freed by such successes from all immediate
fear of Russia, the Germans could then turn in enormous strength
against the Balkan front of the Allies. Under these hypothetical
conditions, one may assume that the Allied army north of Saloniki,
demoralized by the Russian reverses, would be taken prisoners or
driven into the sea.
These various operations in the East vigorously taken in hand, as the
General Staff at Berlin knows so well how to do, would require four
or five months for their execution. This interval of time, combined
with the depressing moral effect brought about by the supposed German
victories, would act, as it were, as an automatic preparation for the
final Teutonic offensive on the Western front. It must be remembered
that during these four or five months the submarine warfare,
pursued more and more ruthlessly, would considerably impede neutral
navigation and decimate the tonnage of the Franco-British merchant
marine. The food-problems and the war-expenditure of the Allies
would be enormously increased. Even if their pressure has forced the
Kaiser to evacuate a considerable portion of France and Belgium, the
importance of this retreat would be only relative, for it would be
temporary. Following our hypothesis, then, if Russia were beaten,
the army of Saloniki driven into the sea, and the food crisis in the
West intensified, the moral depression and discouragement among the
soldiers and civilians of France would be most profound. Under the
given material and psychological conditions, the concentration of all
the Pan-German forces on the Western front would probably permit them
to break through. This would spell ruin for France and for England as
well, and assure that decisive German victory which would mean the
mastery of Europe.
If this theoretical German plan is to be accomplished in 1917,
however, the general technical situation in Europe must remain much
as it stands at present. No new power capable of making itself felt
on the battlefield must come to the support of the Allies. It is
necessary, then, that the scheme be carried out in 1917, before the
Russian Revolution, which is essentially favorable to the Allies,
has time to repair the damage done by the former régime, and before
the United States, realizing that it is to their vital interest to
take part directly and without delay in the war on the Continent, are
ready to do so effectively.
The tactics of Berlin, after being forced to a diplomatic rupture
with Washington, consist in doing everything to avoid actual blows
with the United States, while keeping up a vigorous submarine
campaign, and in making frantic efforts to effect a miscarriage
of American military preparation—especially as regards sending
reinforcements to Europe. In pursuance of this scheme, Berlin
instructed Vienna to send Washington a dilatory answer concerning
submarine warfare, in order to avoid a diplomatic break and thus
gain time. This procedure was specifically intended to make America
believe that Austro-Hungary can act independently of Germany. And so,
by virtue of this delusion, William II veils the existence of that
Pan-Germany whose reality, for the sake of his plans, must not be
revealed until the latest possible moment.
II
If the programme for 1917, which we have good reason to attribute to
the Germans, were substantially carried out (and, after all, this is
not impossible), in six to eight months the United States would find
themselves face to face with a Germany controlling the resources,
not only of the present-day Pan-Germany, but of all Europe. And,
Americans, do not think your turn would be long in coming. Do not
take it for granted that the German people, worn out by the endless
horrors of war, would cry to their masters, ‘Peace at any price!’ The
German people, as I know them, filled with enthusiasm by a victory
that would be without parallel in the history of the world, maddened
by incalculable plunder, would follow the lead of their Emperor
more blindly than ever. The pride and ambition of the Kaiser and
his General Staff are so prodigious that, unless all signs fail,
they would give the United States no chance to organize against a
Prussianized Europe. In eight or ten months, after new advances
had been made to Japan, who would be isolated by the defeat of
her allies in Europe, and with the aid of the German-Mexicans and
German-Americans whose mission, as every one knows, is to paralyze by
every possible means the military organization of the United States,
it would be possible to look for ruthless action against America by
the Pan germanized forces of Europe.
The prediction of such extraordinary eventualities will no doubt
seem fantastic and improbable to many of my American readers. I
beg them, nevertheless, to consider them seriously. As a matter
of fact, if we consider all that has been achieved by the Germans
since August, 1914, the events which I have forecast are much
less amazing than those indicated by me in 1901, when, in my book
_L’Europe et la Question d’Autriche au Seuil du XXe Siècle_, I
unmasked the Pan-German plot, which was then looked on as a mere
phantasmagoria—although as a matter of fact it was so real that it
now stands almost completely fulfilled.
You Americans, then, should learn your lesson from the past. Your
own best interest lays on you the obligation to face facts which
may at present seem improbable, and to prepare yourselves without
losing a day for meeting the gravest perils. As the situation now
stands, a delay in making a decision may involve disastrous results.
For instance, the three weeks of parleying indulged in by the
Allies before deciding to send troops to Serbia were of the utmost
significance. Those three lost weeks simply prevented the Allies from
achieving victory, and resulted in an unthinkable prolongation of the
war.
The surest, the most economical way for Americans to avoid excessive
risks is to prepare at once for the severest kind of struggle, on the
hypothesis that the Allies may sustain grave reverses. Everything
favors concerted action by the United States and the Allies. Their
material and moral interests are identical, and, in doing away with
autocracy, Russia removed the well-justified distrust felt in the
United States for the land of the Tsars. As we have seen, a German
victory over Russia, involving the fall of Saloniki and, later, the
breaking of the Western front, would be unquestionably the most
dangerous eventuality imaginable for the future security of the
United States. American interest therefore demands, not only that
support should be given France and Great Britain, but that the United
States should hasten to help the Russians, who will probably be
called on first to meet the onslaught.
On reflection, perhaps, Americans may even find it worth while to
give further thought to an idea which, a few months ago, would have
seemed preposterous to them. Since President Wilson cherishes the
ideal of the brotherhood of nations,—a noble conception, but one
which can be realized only after Prussian militarism is ground in
the dust, after the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns have gone the
way of the Romanoffs,—why should not this world-crisis provide an
opportunity for intimate coöperation between the United States and
Japan?
Even if Americans were to admit the necessity of so doing, it will
be long before they are in the position to throw into the European
conflict those reinforcements which, by exercising a decisive
influence, would hasten the end of the mad slaughter. At the present
moment Japan alone, outside of Europe, has at her disposal a trained
army capable of taking the field at once. Everything considered,
President Wilson might well decide that the interests of humanity
called for the intervention of Japan in Europe. If he succeeded
in convincing Tokyo of this, he would stand out as the great,
decisive figure of the war. From the technical point of view, it
is certain that victory for the Allies calls for a simultaneous
concentric attack on all the fronts of Pan-Germany. For that reason,
Japanese troops on the Russian line, at Bagdad, Alexandretta, and
Saloniki, would furnish the Eastern positions of the Allies with the
supplementary strength that they need to achieve decisive results and
so hasten the end of the whole war.
Let me again urge my point that the line of action morally and
materially most profitable to the United States is that which,
by achieving the total destruction of Pan-Germany and Prussian
militarism, will terminate the horrible carnage once for all. This
is the moral pointed by the past. If the Allies had undertaken the
Saloniki-Belgrade expedition in the beginning of 1915, the war would
have ended a year ago. If you, Americans, had cast your lot with
us a year ago, it would be ending about now. If you act to-day,
with all your energies, and especially if you compass the Japanese
intervention, you will save the lives of millions of men who, without
your military and diplomatic support, will surely be sacrificed.
The real problem for America is clearly to discern Pan-Germany
lurking beneath the Quadruple Alliance of the Central Powers, and to
decide to strike this Pan-Germany quick and hard. This is the one and
only way to foil the odious Prussian militarism which threatens the
liberty of the world.
CHAPTER VI
PAN-GERMANY’S STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS
In April last, when it was generally believed in Paris that the
Revolution at Petrograd made certain the end of German influence over
the vast former Empire of the Tsars, I wrote the study referred to
on page 81 and reprinted here as Chapters IV and V.[1] I then said,
[In Russia] ‘Where conditions were ripe for idealistic extremists to
guide the revolution toward pacifism or anarchy, there are alarming
symptoms of the prevalence of the latter condition. The swarming
agents of Germany are working there without respite. If their efforts
succeed, the strength of Russia will swiftly dissolve.’
Unhappily, events have justified this word of caution in only too
full measure. The efforts of the Allies to reorganize the forces of
Russia have thus far met with small success. It is a task to which
their duty and their interests alike make it imperative for them to
devote themselves with their utmost strength. But we must cherish no
illusions. The rebuilding of the forces of Russia must inevitably
be a long, arduous, and doubtful undertaking. It is advisable,
therefore, to consider, at the same time, if there is not some
method of making up for the Russian default by bringing into play, to
further the victory of the Entente, certain powerful forces which the
Allies have not thus far even thought of employing.
Now, these forces and this method do exist; but in order to enforce
clearly their reality, their importance, and the way to make use of
them, I must, in the first place, call attention to a fundamental and
enduring error of the Allies, set forth the extraordinary credulity
with which they allow themselves to be ensnared in the never-ending
intrigues of Berlin, and describe the principal shifts which Germany
employs, with undeniable cleverness, to annul to an extraordinary
degree the effect of the Allies’ efforts. These essential causes
of mistaken judgment being eliminated, we shall then be able to
understand what the existing forces are which will enable the Entente
to make up with comparative rapidity for the Russian default, and
to contribute with remarkable efficiency to the destruction of
Pan-Germany.
I
THE FUNDAMENTAL AND ENDURING ERROR OF THE ALLIES
For three years past events have notoriously proved that the concrete
Pangermanist scheme, developed between 1895 and 1911, has been
followed strictly by the Germans since the outbreak of hostilities.
Now, the diplomacy of the Entente is devised as if there were no
Pangermanist scheme.
This is the source of all the vital strategical and diplomatic errors
of the Entente—consequences of the failure to understand the German
military and political manœuvring. Here is proof derived from recent
events—one of many which it would be possible to allege.
When it was announced a few weeks ago that Austria would play an
apparently preponderating part in the reconstitution of Poland, a
very large number of newspapers in the Entente countries decided
that ‘it is perfectly evident that the Austrian policy has carried
the day in Poland.’ A similar deduction has led Allied readers to
believe that Vienna has prevailed over Berlin. The result has been to
strengthen the faith of those who deem it possible to impose terms
on Berlin through the channel of Vienna, and even to induce Austria
to conclude a separate peace. Now, to convey such an impression as
this to Allied public opinion is to lead it completely astray. If the
Hapsburgs are playing an apparently predominant part in Poland it is
solely because that part, as we are about to prove, is assigned to
them by the Pangermanist scheme.
In the pamphlet, _Pan-Germany and Central Europe about 1950_,
published in Berlin in 1895, which contains the whole Pangermanist
plan, we find the following:—
‘Poland and Little Russia [the kingdom to be established at Russia’s
expense] will agree to have no armies of their own, and will receive
in their fortresses German or Austrian garrisons. In Poland, as
well as in Little Russia, the postal and telegraph services and the
railways will be in German hands.’
For twenty-two years the Pangermanist scheme has been followed up.
Tannenberg, in his book, _Greater Germany_, which appeared in 1911,—a
work whose exceptional importance has been demonstrated by events,
and which, in all probability, was inspired officially,—prophesies
very distinctly,—
‘_The new kingdom of Poland is made up of the former Russian portion,
of the basin of the Vistula, and of Galicia, and forms a part of the
new Austria._’
These most unequivocal words appeared, it will be admitted, _three
years before the war_. Now _Le Temps_ of September 7, 1917, said on
the authority of the Polish agency at Berne, which is subsidized by
Austria and publishes news communicated to it by the government of
Vienna,—
‘Germany would take such portion of Russian Poland as she needs to
rectify her “strategic frontiers.” This portion would include almost
a tenth of Russian Poland. _The rest would be annexed to Austria.
The Emperor Charles would thereupon issue a decree of annexation of
Russian Poland to Galicia, under the title of Kingdom of Poland._...
The dual monarchy would then become triple, and the first result of
this readjustment would be to compel all Poles to undergo military
service in the Austrian armies. All the deputies representing Galicia
would automatically leave the Austrian Reichsrath, to enter the
new Polish Parliament, which would give the German parties in the
Austrian Parliament a certain absolute majority.’
This result of the present action of Vienna and Berlin, foreshadowed
by the _Temps_ apparently for the near future, has been in view for
twenty-two years. In fact, in the fundamental pamphlet of 1895,
already quoted, it is said that ‘_Galicia and the Bukowina will be
excluded from the Austrian monarchy. They will form the nucleus of
the kingdoms of Poland and Little Russia ... which, however, may be
united, by the personal link of the sovereign, to the reigning house
of Hapsburg._’
So it is that, very far from having forced anything on Germany in
relation to Poland, Charles I of Hapsburg has shown that he submits
with docility to the Pangermanist decrees, since he gives his entire
adhesion to the carrying into effect of the plan followed at Berlin
from 1895 to 1914—for nineteen years before hostilities began!
The actual fact, therefore, is the direct antithesis of what the
conclusions of many Allied newspapers have, of course in absolute
good faith, permitted their readers to believe. Now everything goes
to show that this error arises solely from a technical ignorance
of the Pangermanist scheme, of which the guiding spirits of the
Entente seem to have no more conception than a considerable portion
of the Allied press. However, if they wish for victory, the Allies
must inevitably act in systematic opposition to the Pangermanist
scheme. They cannot therefore dispense with the necessity of becoming
thoroughly familiar with it.
Nor is there any more reliable guide, since the events that have
taken place for three years past have demonstrated the absolute
accuracy of the Pangermanist outgivings anterior to the war.
Knowing what the Germans are going to do, we can deduce therefrom
the best means of opposing it. If this method had been followed,
no serious error would have been committed by the Allies. They
would have understood that Germany was making war in behalf of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf enterprise,—which was intended to supply her
with the instruments of world-domination; that, consequently, the
Danube front, _which the Allies held_, must be retained at whatever
cost, which would have been, comparatively speaking, very easy, if
they had recognized in time this imperative necessity.
Now, if the Allies had retained their hold of the Danube front, the
war would have been over nearly two years ago. It is, in fact,
solely because they did not grasp the necessity of thus holding it,
that the Germans have been able to carry out their Eastern plan and
to constitute the Pan-Germany which must now be destroyed in order
to avoid the defeat of civilization, and eventual slavery. To effect
this destruction is infinitely easier than is generally believed,
on the condition that the most is made of the causes tending to
the internal dissolution of Pan-Germany. But, to understand these
available causes, familiarity with the Pangermanist scheme is
indispensable. It is urgently necessary, therefore, to put an end to
this intolerable condition, namely, that, while the Allies have an
extraordinary opportunity to become accurately acquainted with the
whole programme of procedure at Berlin, as contained in a multitude
of German documents,—that is to say, the real objects of Germany in
the war,—while they have this opportunity, they go on acting and
arguing as if that programme did not exist. It is this condition
which proves most clearly the extraordinary and enduring credulity
which the Allies exhibit in face of the endless German intrigues.
II
THE CREDULITY OF THE ALLIES
The heads of the Allied governments, moved by the best intentions
but completely taken by surprise by the war, are carrying it on
far too much in accordance with the ordinary procedure of times of
peace—negotiations, declarations, speeches. Notably in the gigantic
palaver into which Maximalist Russia has developed, men fancy that
they have acted when they have talked. The events of three years
of war prove conclusively that the Boches, turning to their profit
the predilection of the Allied leaders for verbal negotiations and
manifestations,—a predilection complicated by ignorance of the
Pangermanist scheme,—have succeeded in nullifying to an extraordinary
degree the effect of the sacrifices of the Entente.
Until the Russian Revolution, Berlin brought to bear on the
diplomacy of the Entente those allies of Germany who were then
regarded by the Entente as neutrals. Indeed, the declarations of
Radoslavoff, confirmed by the recently published Greek _White Book_,
have conclusively established the fact that the agreements between
Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey, and King Constantine, _in contemplation
of this war_, antedated the opening of hostilities—that certain ones
of them go back as far as April, 1914. Now, it is known that the
Entente diplomacy had no knowledge of this situation, and that it
allowed itself to be hoodwinked for three months by the Turks, for
thirteen months by the Bulgarians, for thirty months by the King of
Greece, the Kaiser’s brother-in-law, and even, to a certain degree,
down to a very recent period by Charles I of Hapsburg, certain Allied
diplomatists having persisted in coddling the chimera of a peace with
Austria against Germany.
Unhappily, to solve the present problems, which are, above all,
technical, the best intentions, or even the most genuine natural
intelligence, are insufficient. _It is necessary to know how_, and
one cannot know how without having learned. The Allied Socialists
who have placed themselves in the spotlight have shown themselves to
be, generally speaking, utopists, entirely ignorant of Germany, of
the German mind, of geography, ethnography, and political economy,
pinning their faith, before all else, to formulas, and knowing even
less than the official diplomats of the technique of the multifold
problems imposed by war and peace. As the anti-Prussian German, Dr.
Rosemeier, has stated it so fairly in the New York _Times_, these
idealists, by reason of their radical failure to grasp the inflexible
facts, are doing as much harm to the world in general as the Russian
extremists and their German agents.
It is undeniable that Berlin has found it easy to profit by the
state of mind of the idealistic Socialists of the Entente by causing
its own Social Democrats to put forth the _soi-disant_ ‘democratic’
peace formulas, which for some months past have been infecting the
Allied countries with ideas that are most pernicious because they
are impossible of realization. Despite the efforts of realist
Socialists, men like Plekhanoff, Kropotkin, Guesde, Compère-Morel,
Gompers, and their like, the Stockholm lure, notwithstanding its
clumsiness, has helped powerfully to lead Russia to the brink of the
abyss, and hence to prolong the war and the sacrifices of the Allies.
In France and England a few Socialists have been so genuinely insane
as to say that the occupations of territory by Germany are of slight
importance; that we can begin to think about peace; that Germany is
already conquered _morally_, and so forth. In view of such results,
due to the astounding credulity of the idealistic Socialists of the
Entente, it is quite natural that Germany should pursue her so-called
‘pacifist’ manœuvres.
Late in 1916, the Frankfort _Gazette_ advised its readers of the
spirit in which these intrigues were to be conducted by Berlin. ‘The
point of view is as follows: to put forward precise demands in the
East, and in the West to negotiate on bases _that may be modified.
Negotiation is not synonymous with renunciation._’
This last sentence summarizes the whole of German tactics. All the
proposals of Berlin have but a single object: to deceive and sow
discord among the Allies by means of negotiations which would be
followed by non-execution of the terms agreed upon, Germany retaining
the essential positions of to-day’s war-map which would assure her,
strategically and economically, the domination of Europe and the
world.
Now, it is an astounding fact that the warnings given by the Germans
themselves—the occupation of more than 500,000 square kilometres by
the Kaiser’s troops, the burglarizing of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Turkey by the government of Berlin—have not yet availed to
prevent a considerable proportion of the Allies from continuing to be
enormously deceived. At the very moment when the German General Staff
is strengthening the fortifications of Belgium, especially about
Antwerp, there are those among the Allies who seriously believe that,
by opening negotiations, they will succeed in inducing Germany to
evacuate that ill-fated country and to repair the immense damage that
she has inflicted on her.
There are those who wonder what the objects of the war on Germany’s
part can be, when the occupations of territory by Germany,
corresponding exactly to the Pangermanist scheme dating back
twenty-two years, make these objects as clear as day.
There are those who attach importance to such declarations as the
German Chancellor may choose to make, when every day that passes
forces us to take note of monumental and never-ending German lies and
of the unwearying duplicity of Berlin.
There are those who are willing to listen to talk about a _peace
by negotiation_, when the facts prove that Germany respects no
agreement, that a treaty signed by Berlin is of no value, and that,
furthermore, it is the Germans themselves who so declare. At the very
outbreak of the war Maximilian Harden said, ‘_A single principle
counts—Force._’ And the Frankfort _Gazette_ printed these words:
‘_Law has ceased to exist. Force alone reigns, and we still have
forces at our disposal._’ To Mr. Gerard, United States Ambassador to
Germany, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin said, ‘_We snap our
fingers at treaties._’
After such facts and such declarations, the persistent credulity of a
certain fraction of the Allies is a profoundly distressing thing, for
which the remedy must be found in a popular documentary propaganda,
thoroughly and powerfully prepared.
The pacifist German intrigues are manifest enough. We can
particularize six leading examples, employed by Berlin, either
separately or in combination.
III
THE SIX LEADING PACIFIST GERMAN INTRIGUES
1. _A separate peace between Germany and one of the Entente Allies.
The Alsace-Lorraine coup_
It is evident that the defection of one of the principal Allies would
inevitably place all the others in a situation infinitely more
difficult for continuing the struggle. If we assume such a defection,
the Germans might well hope to negotiate concerning peace on the
basis of their present conquests.
That is why they have multiplied proposals for a separate peace
with the Russians. At Berlin they are especially apprehensive of
a continuance of the war by Russia because of the inexhaustible
reserves of men possessed by the former Empire of the Tsars. The time
will probably come when they will attempt also to lure Italy from the
coalition by offering her the Trentino, and if necessary, Trieste, at
Austria’s expense, this last-named cession, however, being destined,
in the German plan, to be temporary only.
The desire to break up the coalition at any cost is so intense among
the Germans, that we must anticipate that, at the psychological
moment, they will even go so far as to offer to restore
Alsace-Lorraine to France. As for the sincerity of such an offer,
these words of Maximilian Harden, written early in 1916, enable us to
estimate it:—
‘If people think in France that the reëstablishment of peace is
possible only through the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and _if
necessity compels us to sign such a peace, the seventy millions of
Germans will soon tear it up_.’
Moreover, nothing would be less difficult for Germany, thanks
to the effective forces of Central Pan-Germany, than to seize
Alsace-Lorraine again, very shortly, having given it up momentarily
as a tactical manœuvre.
2. _A separate peace between Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary,
and the Entente_
A particularly astute manœuvre on the part of Berlin consists in
favoring, under the rose, not perhaps a formally executed separate
peace, but, at least (as has already taken place), semi-official
negotiations for a separate peace between her own allies named above
and the Entente.
The particular profit of this sort of manœuvre in relation to the
definitive consummation of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, is
readily seen if we imagine the Allies signing a treaty of peace
with Turkey, for instance. In such a hypothesis the Allies could
treat only with the liegemen of Berlin at Constantinople, for
all the other Turkish parties having any political importance
whatsoever have been suppressed. Now, if the Allies should treat
with the Ottoman government, reeking with the blood of a million
Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, massacred _en masse_ as anti-Germans
and friends of the Entente, the following results would follow from
this negotiation: the Entente, agreeing not to punish the unheard-of
crimes committed in Turkey, would renounce its moral platform: it
could no longer claim to be fighting in the name of civilization.
The Turkish government, which is notoriously composed of assassins,
would be officially recognized; and thus the self-same group of
men who sold the Ottoman Empire to Germany would be confirmed in
power—the group whose leader, Talaat Pasha, declared in the Ottoman
Chamber in February, 1917, ‘We are allied to the Central Powers
for life and death!’ The control by Germany of the Dardanelles, a
strategic position of vast and world-wide importance, guarded by her
accomplices, would be confirmed; the numerous conventions signed
at Berlin in January, 1917, which effectively establish the most
unrestricted German protectorate over the whole of Turkey, would
accomplish their full effect during a Pan-German peace.
The Bulgarian intrigues for a so-called separate peace with the
Allies have been at least as numerous as those of the Turks of the
same nature. In reality, the Bulgarian agents who were sent to
Switzerland to inveigle certain semi-official agents of the Entente
into negotiations, were there by arrangement with Berlin for the
purpose of sounding the Allies, in order to determine to what degree
they were weary of the war. The Bulgarians have never been really
disposed to conclude peace with the Entente based on compromise upon
equitable conditions. They desire a peace which will assure them
immense acquisitions of territory at the expense of the Greeks, the
Roumanians, and, especially, the Serbians, for at Sofia they crave,
above all things, direct geographical contact with Hungary. Thus the
great Allied Powers could treat with the Bulgarians only by being
guilty of the monstrous infamy of sacrificing their small Balkan
allies, and of assenting to a territorial arrangement which would
permit Bulgaria to continue to be the Pangermanist bridge between
Hungary and Turkey over the dead body of Serbia—an indispensable
element in the functioning of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, and
hence of Central Pan-Germany.
Now, this is precisely the one substantial result of the war to
which Bulgaria clings above all else. So it is that a peace by
negotiation—in reality a peace of lassitude—between the Allies and
Bulgaria, would simply give sanction to this state of affairs.
In the same way, such a peace with Austria-Hungary could but give
definitive shape to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme. From the
financial and military standpoint, the monarchy of the Hapsburgs,
considered as a state, is to-day absolutely subservient to Germany.
The reigning Hapsburg, whatever his private sentiments, can no longer
do anything without the consent of the Hohenzollern. Any treaty of
peace signed by Vienna would be, practically, only a treaty of which
the conditions were authorized by Berlin. There must be no illusion.
Nothing less than the decisive victory of the Allies will avail to
make Germany loosen her grip upon Austria-Hungary, _for that grip is
to Germany the substantial result of the war_. In truth it is that
grip which, by its geographic, military, and economic consequences,
assures Berlin the domination of the Balkans, and of the East, hence
of Central Pan-Germany, hence of Hamburg-Persian Gulf, and the vast
consequences which derive therefrom.
Let us make up our minds, therefore, that all the feelers toward a
separate peace with Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary, which have
been put forth and which will hereafter be put forth, have been and
will be simply manœuvres aimed at a so-called peace by negotiation,
which would cloak, not simply a German, but a Pan-German peace.
3. _The democratization of Germany_
Certain Allied groups having apparently made up their minds that
the ‘democratization’ of Germany would suffice to put an end
automatically to Prussian militarism and to German imperialism,
it was concluded at Berlin that a considerable number, at least,
of their adversaries, being weary of the war, might be willing
to content themselves with a merely formal satisfaction of their
demands, in order to have an ostensibly honorable excuse for bringing
it to an end. That is why, with the aim of leading the Allies off the
scent and inducing them to enter into negotiations, Berlin devoted
herself during the first six months of 1917, with increasing energy,
to the farce called ‘the democratization of Germany.’ Meanwhile
the most bigoted Pangermanists put the mute on their demands. They
ceased to utter the words ‘annexations’ or ‘war-indemnities.’ They
talked of nothing but ‘special political arrangements’—a phrase which
in their minds led to the same result but had the advantage of not
embarrassing the peace-at-any-price men in the Allied countries.
The device of democratization of Germany was complementary to the
Stockholm trick, which, as we know, was intended to convince the
Russian Socialists that Russia had no further advantage to expect
from continuing the war, since Germany in her turn, was about to
enter in all seriousness upon the path of democracy—and so forth.
We must acknowledge that many among the Allied peoples allowed
themselves to be ensnared for the moment by this manœuvre, and
honestly believed that Germany was about to reform, of her own motion
and radically. But when the German tactics had achieved the immense
result of setting anarchy loose in Russia,—a state of affairs which
was instantly made the most of in a military sense by the Staff at
Berlin,—the farce of the democratization of Germany was abandoned.
Von Bethmann-Hollweg was sacrificed to the necessity of dropping
a scheme which he had managed, and Michaelis—Hindenburg’s man,
and therefore the man of the Prussian military party and of the
Pangermanists—succeeded him.
As a matter of fact, the Germans have, for all time, had such an
inveterate penchant for rapine that they are quite capable of
setting up a great military republic and submitting readily enough
to Prussian discipline, with a view to starting afresh upon wars for
plunder.
We must bear this truth constantly in mind: if the Hohenzollerns have
succeeded, in accordance with Mirabeau’s epigram, in making war ‘the
national industry,’ it is because, ever since the dawn of history,
the Germans have always subordinated everything to their passion for
lucrative wars. The same is true of them to-day. Especially in the
last twenty years the secret propaganda of the Berlin government has
convinced the masses that the creation of Pan-Germany will assure
them immense material benefits. It is because this conviction is
so firmly rooted among them that substantially the entire body of
Socialist workingmen are serving their Kaiser without flinching, and
are willing to endure the horrors of the present conflict so long
as it may be necessary and so long as they are not conquered in the
field.
4. _Peace through the International_
This is another of the tricks conceived at Berlin. In reality
the International, having always followed the direction of the
German Marxists, has been the chief means employed for thirty
years to deceive the Socialists of the countries now in alliance
against Germany by inducing them to believe that war, thanks to
the International alone, could never again break out. In a report
on ‘the international relations of the German workingmen’s unions’
(1914), the Imperial Bureau of Statistics was able to proclaim as
an undeniable truth: ‘In all the international organizations German
influence predominates.’
The conference at Stockholm, initiated by German agents, and that
at Berne, upon which they are now at work, are steps which German
unionism is taking to reëstablish over the workingmen of all lands
the German influence, which has vanished since the war began.
The idea now is to force the proletariat of the whole world into
subjection to the guiding hand of Germany. The object officially
avowed is to rehabilitate the International in the interest of
democracy. In reality, it is proposed, above all else, to replace in
the front rank the struggle between classes in the Allied countries,
in order to destroy the sacred unity that is indispensable to
enable the most divergent parties to wage war vigorously against
Pangermanist Germany. As the Berlin government is well aware that
it has nothing to fear from its own Socialists, the vast majority
of whom, even when they disown the title of Pangermanists, are
partisans of Central Pan-Germany, the profit of the manœuvre based
on the International would inure entirely to Germany, who would
retain her power of moral resistance unimpaired, while the Allied
states, once more in the grip of the bitterest social discord,
would find their offensive powers so diminished by this means that
peace would in the end be negotiated on the basis of the present
territorial occupations of Germany.
5. _The armistice trick_
All the schemes hitherto discussed, whether employed singly or in
combination, are intended, first and last, to assist in playing
the armistice trick on the Allies. This is based upon an astute
calculation, still founded on the weariness of the combatants,
which is so easily understood after a war as exhausting as that now
in progress. At Berlin they reason thus—and the reasoning is not
without force: ‘If an armistice is agreed upon, the Allied troops
will say, “They’re talking, so peace is coming, and, before long,
demobilization.” Under these conditions our adversaries will undergo
a relaxation of their moral fibre.’
The Germans would ask nothing more. They would enter upon peace
negotiations with the following astute idea. If, hypothetically, the
Allies should make the enormous blunder of discussing terms of peace
on bases so craftily devised, Germany, being still intrenched behind
her fronts which had been made almost impregnable, would end by
saying, ‘I am not in accord with you. After all is said, you cannot
demand that I evacuate territory from which you are powerless to
expel me. If you are not satisfied, go on with the war.’
Inasmuch as, during the negotiations, everything essential would
have been done by German agents to accentuate the moral relaxation
of the country which was most exhausted by the conflict, as they
succeeded in doing in Russia in the first months of the Revolution,
the immense military machine of the Entente could not again be set
in motion in all its parts. The result would be the breaking asunder
of the anti-German coalition, and, finally, the conclusion of peace
substantially on the basis of existing conquests. Thus Berlin’s
object would be attained.
6. _The ‘status quo ante’ trick_
The last of the German schemes, and the most dangerous of all, is
that concealed under the formula, ‘No annexations or indemnities’—a
formidable trap, which, as I have pointed out in earlier chapters,
has for its object to confirm Germany in the possession of the
gigantic advantages which she has derived from the war, and which
would assure her the domination of the world, leaving the Allies with
their huge war-losses, whose inevitable economic after-effects would
suffice to reduce them to a state of absolute servitude with respect
to Berlin.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See _Atlantic Monthly_, June, 1917, p. 721.
CHAPTER VII
THE BEST WAY TO CRUSH PAN-GERMANY
I
THE UNITED STATES AND THE VASSALS OF BERLIN
In the wholly novel plan which I am about to set forth, the United
States may play a preponderating and decisive part; but by way of
preamble I must call attention to the fact that the United States is
not, in my judgment, as I write these lines, in a position to give
its full effective assistance in the conflict, because it is not
officially and wholeheartedly at war with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Turkey—states in thrall to Berlin and constituent parts of
Pan-Germany. This situation is, I am fully convinced, unfavorable to
the interests of the Allies, and it paralyzes American action, for
these reasons.
As a matter of fact, Germany can no longer carry on the war against
the Entente save by virtue of the troops and resources which are
placed at her disposal by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.
If the Allies wish to conquer Germany, their chief adversary, it
is necessary that they understand that they must _first of all_
deprive Prussian militarism of the support—apparently secondary, but
really essential—which it receives from its allied vassals. It is,
furthermore, eminently desirable that it should be recognized in the
United States that Turkish, Bulgar, Magyar, and Austrian imperialism
are bases of Prussian imperialism, and that in order to establish a
lasting peace, the disappearance of these secondary imperialisms is
as necessary as that of Prussian imperialism itself. Moreover, the
fact that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are not officially at
war with the United States enables Berlin to maintain connections in
America of which we may be sure that she avails herself to the utmost.
This situation is propitious also for that German manœuvre which
consists in making people think that a separate peace is possible
between Turkey, or Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary on the one side and
the powers of the Entente on the other. However, as the game to be
played is complicated and difficult, good sense suggests that we
proceed from the simple to the complex, and hence that we strike the
enemy first of all in his most vulnerable part. Now, as we shall
see, it is mainly in the territory of the three vassals of Germany
that the new plan which I am about to set forth can be carried out
in the first instance, without, however, causing any prejudice—_far,
far_ from it,—to the invaluable assistance which the Americans are
preparing to bring to the Allies on the Western front. For all these
reasons, it seems desirable that American public opinion should
admit the imperious necessity of a situation absolutely unequivocal
with regard to the governments of Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna,
and Budapest, which are vassals of Berlin and by that same token
substantial pillars of Pan-Germany.
II
DESTRUCTION OF PAN-GERMANY BY INTERNAL EXPLOSION
I believe that I have demonstrated, in earlier chapters of this
book that, because of the advantages, economic and military, which
the existence of Central Pan-Germany guarantees to Germany for both
present and future, the essential, vital problem that the Allies have
to solve—a problem which sums up all the others—is, how to destroy
this Central Pan-Germany.
It is infinitely easier to destroy than is generally supposed among
the Allies, because it contains potent sources of dissolution. The
Allied leaders seem not to have bestowed upon this situation the
extremely careful attention which it deserves. In any event, down to
the present time they have not sought to take advantage of a state of
affairs which is eminently favorable to them.
To understand this situation, and how it may be utilized at once, we
must set out from the following starting-point. Of about 176,000,000
inhabitants of Pan-Germany in 1917, about 73,000,000 Germans, with
the backing of only 21,000,000 vassals—Magyars, Bulgars, Turks,—have
to-day reduced to slavery the immense number of 82,000,000 allied
subjects—Slavs, Latins, or Semites, belonging to thirteen different
nationalities, all of whom desire the victory of the Entente, since
that alone will assure their liberation. In addition, a considerable
portion of Germany’s vassals would, under certain conditions, gladly
throw off the yoke of Berlin.
Among the 176,000,000 people of Pan-Germany we distinguish the
following three groups.
_Group 1._ Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals capable of
immediate action favorable to the Entente—say, 63,000,000, made up as
follows:—
(_a_) In Turkey,—
Arabs 8,000,000
Generally speaking the Arabs detest the Turks. A portion of them have
risen in revolt in Arabia, under the leadership of the King of Hedjaz.
(_b_) In Central Europe,—
Polish-Lithuanians 22,000,000
Ruthenians 5,500,000
Czechs 8,500,000
Jugo-Slavs 11,000,000
Roumanians 8,000,000
——————————
55,000,000
There are, then, in Central Europe alone, 55,000,000 people
determinedly hostile to Germanism, forming an enormous, favorably
grouped mass, occupying a vast territory, commanding a part of the
German lines of communication, and comparatively far from the fronts
where the bulk of the German military forces is.
Moreover, at the present crisis, these 55,000,000 human beings,
subjected to the most heartless German and Bulgarian terrorism,
are coming to understand better and better that the only means of
escape from a ghastly slavery, from which there is no appeal, is to
contribute at the earliest possible moment to the victory of the
Entente. The insurrectionary commotions that have already taken
place in Poland, Bohemia, and Transylvania, prove what a limitless
development these outbreaks might take on if the Allies should do
what they ought to do to meet this psychological condition. It is
clear that, if these 55,000,000 slaves of Central Europe should
revolt in increasing numbers, this result would follow first of all:
_the default of Russia would be supplied_. Indeed, the Germans, being
harassed in rear of their Eastern fronts, would be considerably
impeded in their military operations and in their communications.
Under such conditions the attacks of the Allies would have much more
chance of success than they have to-day.
_Group 2._ Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals, who cannot stir
to-day, being too near the military fronts, but whose action might
follow that of the first group—nearly 16,000,000, made up as follows:—
(_a_) In Turkey,—
Ottoman Greeks 2,000,000
Armenians 1,000,000
—————————
3,000,000
(_b_) On the Western front,—
French 3,000,000
Belgians 7,500,000
Alsatians and Lorrainers 1,500,000
Italians 800,000
——————————
12,800,000
_Group 3._ Vassals of Germany, possible rebels against the yoke of
Berlin after the uprising of the first group—about 9,000,000.
Of 10,000,000 Magyars, there are—a fact not generally known among the
Allies—9,000,000 poor agricultural laborers cynically exploited by
one million nobles, priests, and officials. These 9,000,000 Magyar
proletarians are exceedingly desirous of peace. As they did not want
the war, they detest those who forced it on them. They would be
quite capable of revolting at the last moment against their feudal
exploiters, if the Allies, estimating accurately the shocking social
conditions of these poor Magyars, were able to assure them that the
victory of the Entente would put an end to the agrarian and feudal
system under which they suffer.
Is not this a state of affairs eminently favorable to the interests
of the Allies? Would not the Germans in our place have turned it
to their utmost advantage long ago? Does not common sense tell us
that if, in view of the pressure on their battle fronts, the Allies
knew enough to do what is necessary to induce the successive revolts
of the three groups whose existence we have pointed out, a potent
internal element in the downfall of Pan-Germany would become more and
more potent, adding its effects to the efforts which the Allies have
confined themselves thus far to putting forth on the extreme outer
circumference of Pan-Germany?
Let us inquire how this assistance of the 88,000,000 persons confined
in Pan-Germany in their own despite can be obtained and made really
effective.
Let us start with an indisputable fact. The immense results which the
German propaganda has achieved in barely five months in boundless
Russia, with her 182,000,000 inhabitants, where it has brought
about, in Siberia as well as in Europe, separatist movements which,
for the most part,—I speak of them because I have traveled and
studied much in Russia,—would never have taken place but for their
artificial agitation,—these results constitute, beyond dispute, a
striking demonstration of what the Allies might do if they should
exert themselves to act upon races radically anti-Boche, held captive
against their will in Pan-Germany. Assuredly, in the matter of
propaganda, the Allies are very far from being as well equipped as
the Germans and from knowing how to go about it as they do. But the
Germans and their vassals are so profoundly detested by the people
whom they are oppressing in Pan-Germany; these people understand so
fully that the remnant of their liberty is threatened in the most
uncompromising way; they are so clearly aware that they can free
themselves from the German-Turkish-Magyar yoke only as a result
of this war and of the decisive victory of the Entente, that they
realize more clearly every day that their motto must be, ‘Now or
never.’
Considering this state of mind, so favorable to the Allies, a
propaganda on the part of the Entente, even if prepared with
only moderate skill, would speedily obtain very great results.
Furthermore, the desperate efforts which Austria-Hungary, at the
instigation of Berlin and with the backing of the Stockholmists
and the Pope, was making to conclude peace before its threatening
internal explosion, show how precarious German hegemony in Central
Europe still is. The Austro-Boches are so afraid of the extension
of the local disturbances which have already taken place in Poland
and Bohemia, that they have not yet dared to repress them root
and branch. Those wretches, to fortify themselves against these
anti-German popular commotions, resort to famine. At the present
moment, notably in the Jugo-Slav districts and in Bohemia, the
Austro-Germans are removing the greatest possible quantity of
provisions in order to hold the people in check by hunger. But this
hateful expedient itself combines with all the rest to convince these
martyrized peoples of the urgent necessity of rising in revolt if
they prefer not to be half annihilated like the Serbs.
To make sure of the constant spread and certain effectiveness of the
latent troubles of the oppressed Slavs and Latins of Central Europe,
there is need on the part of the Allies, first of moral suasion, then
of material assistance.
To understand the necessity and the usefulness of the first, it must
be said that, despite all the precautions taken by the Austro-Boche
authorities, the declarations of the Entente in behalf of the
oppressed peoples of Central Europe become known to these latter
comparatively soon, and that these declarations help greatly to
sustain their _morale_. For example, President Wilson’s message of
January 22, 1917, in which he urged the independence and unification
of Poland, and his ‘Flag Day’ speech, on June 15, in which he set
forth the great and intolerable peril of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf
scheme, manifestly strengthened the determination of the Poles, the
Czechs, and the Jugo-Slavs to free themselves at whatever cost from
the fatal yoke of Vienna and Berlin. In addition, the constantly
increasing power of the aeroplane enables the Allies to spread
important communications broadcast over enemy territory.
First of all, it is essential that the three races which, by
reason of their geographical situation and their ethnographical
characteristics are indispensable in any reconstitution of Central
Europe based on the principle of nationalities, and who consequently
have a leading part to play in the centre of the Pan-Germany of
to-day, should be, one and all, absolutely convinced that the victory
of the Entente will make certain their complete independence. The
Poles have received this assurance on divers occasions, notably from
President Wilson, and very recently from M. Ribot, commemorating in a
dispatch to the Polish Congress at Moscow ‘the reconstitution of the
independence and unity of all the Polish territories to the shores of
the Baltic.’ But the 11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs and the 8,500,000 Czechs
have not yet received from the leaders of the Entente sufficiently
explicit and repeated assurances.
There are two reasons why this is so. In the first place, the
absolutely chimerical hope of separating Austria-Hungary from Germany
has obsessed, down to a very recent date, certain exalted personages
of the Entente, who, having never had an opportunity to study on the
spot the latest developments in Austria, still believe in the old
classic formula, ‘If Austria did not exist, we should have to create
it.’ In the second place, certain other personages of the Entente
incline to the belief that, in order to obtain a swift victory, the
problem of Central Europe is a problem to be avoided. Now, as to this
point, the few men who unquestionably know Austria well—for example,
the Frenchmen Louis Léger, Ernest Denis, M. Haumant, Auguste Gauvain,
and others, and the Englishmen, Sir Arthur Evans, Seton-Watson,
Wickham Steed, and others—are unanimous in being as completely
convinced as I myself am that the breaking-up of the monarchy of
the Hapsburgs is indispensable to the establishment of a lasting
peace—and furthermore, such a breaking-up as a result of the revolt
of the oppressed peoples is one of the most powerful instruments in
the hands of the Entente to bring the war to a victorious close.
In fact, there are certain quasi-mechanical laws which should guide
in the reconstruction of a Europe that can endure. Now, without
a free Bohemia and Jugo-Slavia it is impossible—impossible, I
insist—that Poland should be really free, that Serbia and Roumania
should be restored, that Russia should be released from the grip
of Germany, that Alsace-Lorraine should be restored permanently
to France, that Italy should be protected from German domination
in the Adriatic, in the Balkans, and in Turkey, that the United
States should be warranted against the world-wide results of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf enterprise. Bohemia is the central point of the
whole. With its circle of mountains, it is the indispensable keystone
of the European edifice, rebuilt upon the basis of the principle of
nationalities. Whosoever is master of Bohemia is master of Europe. It
must be, therefore, that liberty shall be master of Bohemia.
On the other hand, it is undeniable that the successive uprisings of
8,500,000 Czechs and 11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs, taking place concurrently
with that of 22,000,000 Poles, is absolutely in line with the present
military interests of the Entente. Therefore, for the Allies to
assume an attitude of reserve toward the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs is as
contrary to the democratic principles they invoke as to their most
urgent strategic interests. But this mistake has been frequently
made, solely because the exceptional importance of Bohemia has not
yet been fully grasped. Mr. Asquith, in his speech of September 26
last, furnishes an example of this regrettable reserve with respect
to the Czechs—a reserve which is diminishing, no doubt, but which
still exists. He said:—
‘If we turn to Central and Eastern Europe, we see purely artificial
territorial arrangements, which are repugnant to the wishes and
interests of the populations directly concerned, and which, so long
as they remain unchanged, will constitute a field fertile in new
wars. There are, first, the claims of Roumania and Italy, so long
overdue; there is heroic Serbia, which not only must be restored
to her home, but which is entitled to more room in which to expand
nationally; and there is Poland. The position of Greece and the South
Slavs must not be forgotten.’
Thus, while Mr. Asquith manifests the best intentions toward the
oppressed peoples of Central Europe, he does not even mention the
Czechs, that is, Bohemia. Now, in reality, all the promises that the
Entente can make concerning Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and Italy, are
not capable of lasting fulfillment unless Bohemia is set free, for
Bohemia dominates all Central Europe. Furthermore, Mr. Asquith’s
silence as to the fate of Bohemia may be a legitimate cause of
uneasiness to the Czechs, who are now doing the impossible to contend
with Germanism, despite the shocking terrorism which lies so heavy
upon them. So we may say, that Mr. Asquith would have served the
interest of the Entente more effectively if he had emphatically named
Bohemia and the Czechs who are so much in need of being supported
and encouraged by the Allies, whom they regard as their liberators.
The misconceptions that have led to the ignoring of the claims of
the Central European Slavs, and of their extreme importance in the
solution of the war-problem, will soon prove themselves an even
heavier load to carry than those committed in Bulgaria and Greece.
To put an end to these vagaries, it is necessary that henceforth
the leaders of the Entente should earnestly encourage, at least the
Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs—that is to say, about 42,000,000 slaves
of Berlin in Central Europe. The encouragement of these peoples as
a single body is indispensable, for, although the Boches are able
to control the local and, so to say, individual insurrectionary
movements, on the contrary, because of the vast area which a general
insurrection of the 42,000,000 would involve, its repression by
the Austro-Boches would be practically impossible. The example of
a successful general uprising would certainly induce a similar
movement by the balance of the 88,000,000 human beings who are
vitally interested in the destruction of Pan-Germany. To bring about
this result, then, the first essential thing to be done is for the
leaders of the Entente to put forth a most unequivocal declaration,
giving the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs assurance that the victory
of the Entente will make certain their complete liberation. It is
impossible to see what there is to hinder such a declaration. Its
effects would soon be discerned if it were enthusiastically supported
by the Allied press and by the Allied Socialists, who, let us hope,
will finally realize that, while it is impossible to bring about a
revolution against Prussian militarism in Germany, it can very easily
be effected in Austria-Hungary.
But, some one will say, a revolution is not possible without material
resources. Naturally, I shall discuss this point only so far as the
interests of the Entente will allow me to do it publicly. In the
first place I will call attention to the fact that, by reason of the
immensity of the territory they occupy, simple passive resistance on
the part of the oppressed races of Central Europe, provided that it
is offered in concert and accompanied by certain essays in the way of
sabotage and strikes, which are easy enough to practice without any
outside assistance, would create almost inextricable difficulties for
the Austro-Germans.
But there is something much better to be done. At first sight, it
seems very difficult for the Allies to bear effective material aid to
the oppressed peoples of Pan-Germany, because they are surrounded by
impregnable military lines. In fact, by combining the results of the
tremendous development of the aviation branch made possible by the
adhesion of the United States, _with certain technical resources_
which are available, the Entente can, comparatively quickly and
easily, supply the Poles and the rest with material assistance which
would prove extraordinarily efficacious.
I am not writing carelessly. I have studied for twenty years these
down-trodden races and the countries in which they live. I know about
the material resources to which I refer. If I do not describe them
more explicitly, it is because no one has yet thought of employing
them, and in such matters silence is a bounden duty. But I am, of
course, at the disposition of the American authorities if they
should wish to know about the resources in question, and to study
them seriously. I am absolutely convinced that, if employed with
due method, determinedly, and scientifically, in accordance with a
special technique, these resources, after a comparatively simple
preparation,—much less in any event than those which have been made
in other enterprises,—would lead to very important results which
would contribute materially to the final decision.[2]
To sum up—in Central Europe, through the liberation, preceded by the
legitimate and necessary revolution, of its martyred peoples, are
found in conjunction: (_a_) the means of making good the default of
Russia; (_b_) the basis of a new and decisive conclusion of the war;
(_c_) the possibility of destroying Central Pan-Germany; (_d_) the
consequent wiping out of the immense advantages from the war which
the mere existence of Pan-Germany assures to Germany; and (_e_) the
elements of a lasting peace upon terms indisputably righteous and
strictly in accordance with the principles of justice invoked by the
Entente.
[Illustration: Decoration]
ANNOUNCEMENT OF OTHER VOLUMES
DEALING WITH THE GREAT WAR
AND PUBLISHED BY
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS
THREE PARK STREET, BOSTON, MASS.
WILL BE FOUND ON THE
FOLLOWING PAGES
FOOTNOTES:
[2] To the editor, M. Chéradame has written with less reserve on this
vital subject; but it seems best to put in print at this time no more
than the suggestion indicated.—_The Editor of the Atlantic Monthly._
THE WAR AND THE SPIRIT OF YOUTH
This book is a spiritual interpretation of the suffering and
sacrifice of the World War, expressed in a group of three papers of
kindred significance, yet written from three different points of view
by a Frenchman, an Englishman, and an American. The volume includes:
YOUNG SOLDIERS OF FRANCE, By Maurice Barrès.
JUVENTUS CHRISTI, By Anne C. E. Allinson.
THE SOUL’S EXPERIENCE, By Sir Francis Younghusband.
Each writer is seeking in the dreadful welter of war some common
revelation of spiritual comfort and advance. Is the agony of these
years meaningless and wanton? Is the heartsickening struggle brutal
and brutalizing, and nothing more? Each, in his or her own way, finds
an answer.
One, a questioner by temperament, has come to see the regeneration
of human life in the miracle which the war has worked in the younger
generation. Another, by profession a soldier, found a new and vivid
faith born of physical impotence and pain. The third, an American
woman, has come to her new belief from far distant fields of the
imagination. All three unite in confidence that the generation now
culminating in manhood is passing through blackness into light
brighter than any dawn the world has known.
The spirit of the volume is the spirit of youth, learning in the
Book of Life, trusting that the best is yet to be, and reading with
shining eyes to the end. It is the spirit or Léo Latil, a young
soldier of France, who, shortly before his death on the edge of a
German trench, wrote to his family, —
Our sacrifices will be sweet if we win a great and glorious
victory,—if there shall be more light for the souls of men; if
truth shall come forth more radiant, more beloved.
THE WAR AND THE SPIRIT OF YOUTH is an inspiring, heartening little
volume. It is well printed, handsomely bound, and sells postpaid for
one dollar.
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS
THREE PARK STREET, BOSTON, MASS.
HEADQUARTERS NIGHTS
By VERNON KELLOGG
When the World War broke out, Vernon Kellogg was Professor of Biology
at Leland Stanford University. As a man of science, he was accustomed
to weigh facts calmly and dispassionately. He was an admirer of
Germany, a neutral, and a pacifist. With the hope of relieving
human suffering, he went to Europe and became special envoy of the
Committee for the Relief of Belgium at German General Headquarters
and at the headquarters of General Von Bissing in Brussels.
For many months, Professor Kellogg lived with Germany’s military
leaders in the West, worked with them, argued with them, learned from
their own lips their aims and principles of life. He saw the workings
of German autocracy among the people it had crushed, heard German
methods defended by some of the ablest men in the Kaiser’s empire,
tried in vain to understand the German point of view.
“Quite four nights of each seven in the week,” he says, “there were
other staff officers in to dinner, and we debated such trifles as
German _Militarismus_, the hate of the world for Germany, American
munitions for the Allies, submarining and Zeppelining, the Kaiser,
the German people.”
These “headquarters nights,” and the days he spent trying to assuage
the misery caused by the German military system, brought about “the
conversion of a pacifist to an ardent supporter, not of War, but of
_this_ war; of fighting this war to a definitive end—that end to be
Germany’s conversion to be a good Germany or not much of any Germany
at all.”
One of the most graphic pictures of the German attitude, the
attitude which rendered this war inevitable, is contained in Vernon
Kellogg’s HEADQUARTERS NIGHTS. It is a convincing, and an evidently
truthful, exposition of the shocking, the unspeakably dreadful,
moral and intellectual perversion of character which makes Germany
at present a menace to the whole civilized world.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
HEADQUARTERS NIGHTS is attractively printed and bound in cloth. Its
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THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS
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THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY AND THE GREAT WAR
During 1918, _The Atlantic Monthly_ will not only print a new
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comprehensive succession of articles dealing with every phase of the
military and political significance of the Great War.
Everyone who wishes to keep informed on the issues of war and peace,
absolutely vital to the world, should read these papers as they are
published.
Over and above these Chéradame articles, month by month, _The
Atlantic_ debates every phase of the Great War, in papers ranging
from the recital of personal adventures by fighting men to
statesmanlike discussions of policy during and after the war.
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY
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Transcriber’s Notes
pg 28 Changed: at her allies’ expense constitutute
to: at her allies’ expense constitute
pg 53 Changed: the reconstruction of these devasted
to: the reconstruction of these devastated
pg 72 Changed: the slavery of eight-two millions
to: the slavery of eighty-two millions
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